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Overview

The MCIOC Planner’s Handbook is intended to describe the basic IO Planner functions in a "how-to" context, and provide a number of templates, forms, and formats that can be used directly or modified to meet the MAGTF’s requirements.

The principle audiences for this Handbook are Marines with little to no IO experience, but appointed to an IO position (planner) within a MAGTF.

This is strictly a draft version. Comments, questions, or critiques on the handbook can be sent to Mr. Jim McNeive at jmcneive@mcia.osis.gov or james.mcneive@usmc.mil.

The current version of this draft has the following chapters and annexes.

- Chapter 1: The World of the IO Planner
- Chapter 2: IO Intelligence Integration
- Chapter 3: IO and the Marine Corps Planning Process
- Chapter 4: IO and the Targeting Process
- Chapter 5: Measuring Success of an Information Operation
- Chapter 6: IO and Culture Integration
- Chapter 7: IO and Information Related Capabilities

- Annex A: Glossary
- Annex B: Questions to Prevent Mirror Imaging
- Annex C: IO related Intel Questions
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- Annex E: Media
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- Annex H: Planning Tool Examples
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Introduction

The proposed Marine Corps definition for information operations (IO) is “the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a target audience’s behavior in order to create an operational advantage for the commander.” A Marine assigned to the duties of an IO Planner must understand what behaviors need to be changed, protected, or enhanced. The planner must also understand what an information environment is, what a target audience is, and how to integrate multiple capabilities in order to achieve an operational advantage.

Information Operations is conducted at all levels of war, during all ranges of military operations, and during all phases of an operation. It is an inherently operational activity that requires a whole of staff approach to integrate and exploit capabilities, synchronize actions, and develop an operational advantage for the command and its subordinate forces. IO is not just tactical messaging, or just Military Information Support Operations (MISO), or just Public Affairs, or just Cyber Operations, or just any of the other capabilities normally linked to IO. IO is a function that integrates multiple capabilities into a focused effort that develops an operational advantage for a MAGTF Commander at a pre-designated point and time in the battle space. This involves planning, coordination, synchronization, and execution of offensive and defensive actions in the information environment. The IO Planner supports this integration and facilitates the execution. Yet despite these facts a common question IO Planners will have to answer is “what is IO.” Being able to articulate an answer to that question, as well as establishing value added to a staff are keys to success to any Marine assigned to the billet of an IO Planner. This chapter is
designed to help answer that question and introduce areas an IO Planner needs to consider during the planning, execution, and assessment of any IO Concept of Support.

Objectives of IO

The objective of IO is to affect the decision making process of selected target audiences so that they will make decisions that are favorable to achieving a command’s end state. In doing so, the IO Planner will address the message, messenger, and the medium of exchange. The MAGTF cannot conduct IO as an afterthought or simply for the sake of checking the IO block. In order to be effective, IO must be a staff planning function that occurs early in and throughout the planning process. It must coordinate and synchronize the effects of all command elements with IO capabilities (abilities to impact the information environment through direct or indirect action). Effective IO is achieved by:

- Focusing offensive and defensive actions in the information environment to impact the information itself (its content and flow) or its dissemination.
- Denying selected information to decision makers.
- Taking actions that expose or demonstrate observable indicators to target audiences that sends a specific message which influences their subjective and objective reasoning, decisions, and ultimate behavior and action.

For IO Planners the principles of IO do not change based on the level of warfare (tactical, operational, or strategic). IO Planners on the MEF staffs will follow the same principles of analyzing and understanding the information environment, and identifying and targeting key decision makers that IO Planners at the MEB, MEU, Division, Regiment, and Battalion levels will follow. Planners at subordinate units will operate in a smaller operating environment and may have to focus on a narrower information environment with more limited target audiences. In addition they may also have fewer capabilities and limited resources to plan and coordinate for. Regardless of the level the operation the IO Planner will have to ensure that any IO Concept of Support is nested with those of higher headquarters.
Terminology

Words have specific meanings, especially as they apply to IO. Common words used by IO Planners include influence, exploit, co-opt, neutralize, mitigate, limit, delay, isolate, protect, degrade, deceive, and disrupt, to name a few. Words commonly used during targeting and planning discussions when referring to IO efforts may have slightly different meanings with respect to other aspects of military planning and execution. An IO Planner must ensure the meanings of words used are in line with their use by other members of the MAGTF. Annex A lists common terms IO Planners may encounter or use. Some recommend techniques when using words:

- If the word has a joint, Marine, or other service definition, use that definition. As a side bar, provide the meaning of the word in the document itself, list in the notes section, or define in supporting products using the word.
- If the word does not have an approved US military definition, staff and socialize the working definition with key staff and seek the Commander’s or Operations Officer’s official approval of the working definition. List the approved definition as a side bar on documents and supporting products that use the word.
- Consider defining the word as it applies to the operation the MAGTF is engaged in, using examples based on the Area of Operation of the MAGTF. Get approval of that definition and list it as a side bar on products using the word.

Role of the IO Planner

An IO Planner owns no assets and must work with the staff in order to integrate IO into all planning functions and ensure the staff understands what IO can and cannot provide. The IO Planner’s task is to ensure the staff understands not only the information environment, but what effects adversary and friendly actions can have in the information environment. Through early participation in all planning efforts the IO Planner will be able to educate key staff on how information can be used to shape the battlespace, support friendly operations, and to degrade adversary capabilities and situation awareness. An early and active role in the planning process will enable the IO Planner to assist in determining the Commander’s stated effects and desired end state. In conjunction with the command’s planning efforts, the IO Planner formulates an IO plan and/or IO Concept of Support, identifies key tasks that will achieve the desired effects, and
integrates those essential tasks into the planning effort. Additionally, the IO Planner should assist in the integration, synchronization, execution of that plan, and participate in the assessment process to help determine the effectiveness of the plan. The planner must be prepared to make recommendations to adjust the plan accordingly based on the assessment. Though responsibilities will be command dependent, the IO Planner must be prepared to do the following:

- Establish good working staff relationships with key members within a command.
- Work closely with Intel so they will produce IO related products that support the planning effort.
- Participate in Operational Planning Teams (OPTs), either as a core member or as lead.
- Support the Marine Corps Planning Process by:
  - Providing an IO Estimate during problem framing and updating it throughout each step in the planning process.
  - Developing an IO Concept of Support during the COA phases and refining it for the approved COA.
  - Writing an Appendix 3 (information operations) to Annex C.
- Participate in the targeting process.
- Lead the Target Audience discussions, especially when MISO support is unavailable.
- Participate in Measures of Effectiveness development and assessment.
- Coordinate and lead an IO Working Group.

Foundations for Success

There are several basic facts an IO Planner must understand and employ in order to be successful. The first is to establish good working relationships within the command; these include, but are not limited to:

- Intelligence: Ensure Intel Analyst supporting IO planning know what is needed in order for both the Analyst and IO Planner to fully understand the information environment.
- Operational Planning Team Leader: Understand what the Commander or OPT leader wants and provide input as directed. Be able to quickly articulate IO support with the ability to back up with details.
• Fires: Understand the targeting process; fully integrate into the targeting boards by working with the Fires Support Coordinator (FSC).
• Staff: Coordinate with members of the staff (CoS, 2, 3, 5, SJA, CA, PA) and ensure primary staff members understand what IO is and is not, what it brings to the fight, and how their capabilities and actions contribute to the IO Concept of Support.

The second is to understand that before any planning can begin all personnel involved in IO planning need to fully understand these foundations of success.

• End State: Know and understand the Commander’s mission and end state.
• Decision Maker: Target those whose decision can impact that end state.
• Information Environment: Understand the information environment of those being targeted.
• Measures of Effectiveness: Be able to assess the results of the targeting.

**Target Audiences**

By joint definition a target audience is “an individual or group selected for influence.” For planning and targeting purposes, Marine IO Planners may consider the following when looking to identify who the MAGTF’s target audience is:

• A target audience can be a key decision maker(s). Decision makers are the primary target of any IO Concept of Support.
• A target audience does not have to be a decision maker, but can be a person, persons, or group that has an influence on a key decision maker. This type of audience can be used when the MAGTF does not have access to the decision maker. Their actions will cause a reaction by the decision maker that is in line with achieving a MAGTF’s end state.

Ultimately, target audiences are those whose decisions can have an impact, either positively or negatively, on a Commander’s end state. They are never US citizens.

These target audiences can have an adversarial, neutral, or friendly relationship towards Marine efforts.
● An adversary refers to a person or persons who may have a hostile intent, whether through lethal or non-lethal means.
● A neutral audience refers to a non-combatant person or persons who may be ambivalent in their attitudes or actions, do not have hostile intent, or have their own agenda.
● A friendly audience refers to allies (civil) or indigenous forces of the host nation elements that are working in conjunction with Marine Forces.

There will be several other types of targets IO Planners will deal with, but these are not considered target audiences.

● A key communicator or individuals who a target audience turns to for information, opinion, or interpretation of information. These individuals are used as conduits to a target audience and can add credibility to a message.
● A thing or system that when targeted causes an action on the information (impacts its content or flow) that effects the target audience.

During the planning process, when deciding who to positively support or who to negatively influence, the command must first identify and assess the key actors in the assigned area of operations and determine which ones could best support or disrupt achievement of the stated end state by identifying:

● Capabilities, requirements, and resources.
● Conduits, direct and indirect, that can influence their decisions.
● Desired actions/behavior.
● Exploitable vulnerabilities.

The more defined that target audience is, the more effective efforts will be to positively influence that audience. Not all key actors of an area will have the ability to support or hinder an end state. Upon determining potential key actors, the Commander must analyze the information environment from the key actor’s point of view. If it is determined that the key actor cannot support or hinder the end state, then different actors should be considered and analyzed. If it is determined that the key actor can support or hinder the end state, then that actor should be targeted. This target audience will be the one the Commander will place resources against in
order to achieve a result that will assist in his achieving his end state. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate information. How the target will be engaged will be based on relationship to other actors, and variables such as history, religion, family, and culture. The Commander must remember that others within and outside the area of operation may also target this actor in order to achieve their own goals. As such, the Commander should always consider himself in competition with others when trying to influence his target audience. Some considerations when addressing target audiences:

- Determine who can be legally, physically, and virtually targeted.
- The more defined the target audience is, the more effective resources and actions can be focused to positively influence that audience and gain the desired behavior/outcome.
- Those selected for influence should be decision makers, or those with access to the decision makers, whose decisions will result in an outcome desired by a Commander.
- When assessing these decision makers, assess from their point of view.
- Identify and assess links, nodes, and networks associated with and support or act as enablers of the decision makers.
- Effective targeting incorporates and builds on the target’s current perceptions and reinforces the desired theme/message through the use of multiple delivery means over a period of time.

Some on the MAGTF staff may not believe “groups” (the masses, mobs, etc) have target audiences within them that can be targeted. Instead they will want to look generically at influencing the group as a whole. The challenge of the IO Planner, working with the Intel Analyst, is to identify those decision makers within a group and resist efforts to target larger, generic groups. All groups have decision makers (political, family, religious, business, etc) that can influence the actions and attitudes of the group. Likewise the same can be said for those who want to target “populations” as a whole. Populations, regardless of their size, are always multi-faceted and the IO Planner should resist efforts to identify audiences as a population. The fear when following this line of thought is planners will develop influence methods using generic means and broad messaging that will not resonate with that population. This could result in undesired effects and inefficient use of sacred command resources. At a minimum, populations should be broken down into the smallest segments possible. Influencing the differing segments of a society requires precisely targeted methods and approaches.
In discussing audiences the term “Key Communicator” is often used, but there is no approved joint or Marine Corps definition of this word. The Army defines key communicators as “individuals to whom members of a target audience turn to for information, opinion, or interpretation of information” (FM 3.05-301). A key communicator can be used as a conduit to a target audience and can add credibility to a message. IO Planners should define the word and seek approval of the definition so that all members of the MAGTF staff have the same understanding.

Chapters 2 and 3 of this handbook will continue on with the discussion on target audiences.

**Information Environment**

An IO Planner’s main focus is the information environment. When analyzing the MAGTF’s Operational Environment the IO Planner should consider the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information within that environment. This aggregate is the information environment and is the principle environment in which decisions are made. A solid understanding of the information environment must be achieved before any planning can begin. This understanding is continually refined throughout the planning process, the execution of operations, and the assessment of those operations. The term information environment is one of those terms many use, but few understand. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. The IO Planner must be able to describe each dimension in detail and also understand that there is no hard division between each one. Information pertaining to a dimension will often bleed over into another dimension.

- Cognitive Dimension: The beliefs, values, and perceptions of a person or persons whose decisions can impact the Commander’s End State.
- Information Dimension: Content of information that has an influencing effect and the way it flows to an audience.
- Physical Dimension: Key individuals and human networks, along with technical and physical infrastructure that supports the information flow to an audience.
Mirror Imaging

One of the key aspects of identifying a target audience is to understand how that audience leverages information and conducts information activities within his information environment. If this is not done then a planner could end up mirror imaging a target audience’s use of information with that of the US or MAGTF. One method of preventing this is to never refer to a target audience’s use of information as Information Operations. Regardless of the sophistication of the target audience using US doctrinal terms to discuss and analyze those capabilities has the potential to lead to mirror imaging. Discussing an ability to leverage information in the same context as U.S. Forces may result in fatal flaws in planning and execution of plans. This is not to say these target audiences do not have the ability to leverage information or target key decision makers in order to achieve their goals, as they absolutely do, some extremely well. Instead it is recommended to break down a target audience’s information activities as the ability to protect, collect, and project information.

- Protect: An ability to protect information deemed critical. This would be information needed to make decisions without being interrupted by someone else’s actions.
• Collect: An ability to collect information on the activities of others, either overtly or covertly, so that the proper decisions will be made that support goals.
• Project: An ability to use various methods to project information to others in order to persuade them to support one’s goals.

Another method to prevent mirror imaging is to ask certain questions throughout the planning and execution phases to ensure our beliefs and norms have not corrupted planning and expectations. See Annex B of this Handbook for list of questions and when they should be asked in order to prevent mirror imaging.

**Themes and Messages**

The IO Planner will have to coordinate the development, or nesting, of command themes and messages and will need to understand what they are and how to use them.

• Themes are normally developed by higher headquarters (meaning Combatant Commands or Joint Headquarters operating above the MAGTF) and support steady state operations, long range goals and objectives, and apply to an entire AO. However, subordinate commands can develop themes to meet specific operations, changing situations, or for specific key leader engagements. A theme is a broad, unifying topic or dominant idea that has a unifying thesis or idea that sets the stage for discussion.
• By joint definition a message is “any thought or idea expressed briefly in a plain or secret language and prepared in a form suitable for transmission by any means of communication.” Messages are actions or supporting bullets of information that communicate the point, moral, or meaning of an action or event, and support or reinforce a theme. Messages are developed by both higher headquarters and the MAGTF and are directed to selected target audiences.

A key role of an IO Planner is to coordinate and ensure the MAGTF and all of its internal or supporting elements disseminate, broadcast, and demonstrate through actions a unified and synchronized message based on command themes. The concept is: “The Command speaks with One Voice.” Messages can be delivered through a variety of means (actions) or conduits to include, but not limited to: MISO products, key leader engagements, interaction between Marines and local audiences, fires, maneuver, and daily routine behavior/actions. A message is
most effective when it is delivered via multiple means, through numerous repetitions, over a period of time. The IO Planner in many cases will not actually deliver the message, but coordinate the development of nested themes and supporting messages. To do this the planner, through the planning process, will be involved in the identification of the audience and the delivery means of the message to that audience. This will involve staff coordination to ensure the message and desired effects are understood by all elements of the MAGTF. It will also involve the synchronization of sequential actions so the message is properly delivered, reinforced, and modified until the desired effect is achieved.

Another key element of IO planning is to understand that command messages will be in competition with diverse messages being delivered by other actors in the AO. These competing messages may target the same audiences and counter the MAGTF’s message. The IO Planner needs to understand these competing messages and their impact. Understanding what actions an adversary, neutral, or friendly is taking in the information environment and what their themes and messaging are conveying is critical in being able to understand their objectives, assess their impact, and if need be develop ways to counter, mitigate, or neutralize their efforts.

IO Cell

Depending on the size of the MAGTF, the IO Planner may operate as part of an IO Cell. For small units that IO Planner may be an IO Cell of one. For larger MAGTFs there may be an IO Cell consisting of several Marines and Sailors. This IO Cell, depending on the MAGTF, may or may not be a formal organization. Though billets may exist in the MAGTF’s Table of Organization, there is no guarantee that all IO related billets will be filled, or filled with trained personnel. The IO Cell should be a part of the G3/S3, but its location within the G3/S3 may be MAGTF dependent. Regardless of its organization or location, the cell is responsible for all IO planning and execution. This includes participating in the MAGTF planning process, participating in the MAGTF targeting process, and coordinating the processes needed to execute and assess an IO related action. A fully functioning IO cell integrates a broad range of potential IO actions and related activities that contribute to accomplishing the mission. IO integration requires extensive planning and coordination among all the elements of the staff. The IO Cell is a mechanism for achieving that coordination.
During planning, the IO Cell should facilitate coordination between various staffs, organizations, and the MAGTF staff elements responsible for planning specific elements of IO. During execution, the cell should remain available to assist in coordination, provide support, or adjust IO efforts as necessary. The IO Cell should have the communications connectivity, either through the combat operations center or separately, to effectively coordinate changing IO requirements, assess changes in the information environment, and modify IO plans.

As mentioned, it is up to the MAGTF on how they will staff an IO Cell and to what level. The senior member of the cell will be the IO Chief and, given the opportunity, may recommend staff levels for the IO Cell. The IO Chief should look to have IO Planners, one or more intelligence representatives, subject matter experts (SME) on IO related capabilities, an IO Cell SNCO, and if possible an IO representative who will be with each shift in the combat operations center.

The IO Cell cannot plan in isolation. It must interact with other elements of the MAGTF staff, and coordinate with IO Cells of subordinate elements and with IO Cells of higher headquarters or adjacent commands. The cell may also have to work with other Department of Defense (DoD) and US Government Agencies in order to plan, integrate, and coordinate activities.

**IO Working Group**

When integrating more than two entities it becomes necessary to have a regular meeting to de-conflict. That is the function of an IO Working Group (IOWG). The IOWG provides a venue for those outside the IO Cell working IO issues the opportunity to plan, request support, synchronize issues, and assess effectiveness of actions. It can be an effective tool to coordinate IO plans and targeting efforts with senior, subordinate, adjacent, or supporting commands. There is no set format or frequency for an IOWG, but it should be conducted as often as needed, while at the same time not being conducted too often that it detracts from other duties. Timing of an IOWG should be included as part of the MAGTF’s staff battle rhythm.

The IO Cell Chief normally runs the IOWG and should set the frequency of the meetings. In addition, for each meeting the IO Cell Chief will identify the purpose or objective, determine the meeting’s length of time, and publish an agenda. Upon completion of the meeting the Cell Chief will coordinate production and dissemination of IOWG due-outs/products. The IO Chief should also ensure appropriate members of the MAGTF staff are invited and attend the IOWG. If
possible representatives to an IOWG should include SMEs on IO related capabilities (especially the Public Affairs Officer and Civil Affairs Officer), intelligence representatives, legal representatives, cultural SMEs, other members of the G3/S3 as required, representatives from units that will be executing an IO related activity, and others deemed necessary.

**IO Capabilities**

Military operations are not planned for the purpose of employing any particular capability. Information Operations are no different. By doctrine there are several capabilities that are normally linked to IO and the IO Planner needs to understand, at a minimum, the basics of each. The planner, though, should not get trapped by believing these are the only capabilities to consider. Capabilities used for IO should be based on mission requirements and the IO Planner should consider both doctrinal and non-doctrinal methods to accomplish the mission. As a rule of thumb the IO Planner should consider any legal capability that can influence a decision maker.

IO capabilities according to the Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations (dated 13 February 2006). Chapter 7 discusses capabilities in more detail.

- **Core**: Integrated into the planning and execution of operations in the information environment. Include Psychological Operations (PSYOP)/Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO)/Cyberspace Operations (CO).
- **Supporting**: Have military purposes other than IO but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the information environment. Include Information assurance (IA), Physical security, Physical attack, Counterintelligence, and Combat Camera (COMCAM).
- **Related**: Have common interfaces with IO, but primary purposes and rules make them separate and distinct. Include Public affairs (PA), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.
Information Superiority

By definition information superiority is “the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” (JP 3-13). The IO Planner may want to work with his Commander or Operations Officer to establish what exactly information superiority means in regard to any operation the MAGTF conducts.

The ultimate goal of the IO Planner is for the MAGTF Commander to achieve information superiority, but what that really means may not be fully understood by the Commander or his staff. Often information superiority is falsely misinterpreted by many to be similar to air or naval superiority or supremacy. Due to the nature of information in the modern area, the numerous and complex means of communication, and the rapid advances in information technology, the ability of even the weakest adversary to leverage information may be substantial. Adversaries and other interested parties will have varied and diverse abilities, and may be able to disseminate their information through a myriad of channels. Such abilities must not be underestimated. However, information superiority is achievable, but it should be considered something that is very perishable. Information Operations is the ability to coordinate and synchronize operations in order to develop an information advantage into an operational advantage (information superiority) for limited periods of time at a specific geographic location.

The IO Planner should also manage expectations when it comes to information superiority so that the MAGTF will not have unrealistic goals. The IO Planner should temper information superiority discussions in terms of an operational advantage developed for a specified time and space when it comes to MAGTF goals or end state.

Operational Advantage

A major element of the proposed Marine Corps definition for IO is creating an operational advantage. Information superiority plays a role in this, though it can be fleeting at the most. As such, an operational advantage as it pertains to IO can be considered any condition, circumstance, opportunity or means in the information environment favorable to success or desired end state of campaigns or major operations planned, conducted or sustained to achieve strategic objectives. An information superiority gained would always be an operational
advantage (more like "tactical advantage" given the transitory nature of the "superiority" and/or localness of the superiority), however every operational advantage as it pertains to IO is not necessarily information superiority. As with information superiority, the IO Planner may want to work with his Commander or Operations Officer to establish what exactly an operational advantage means in regards to any operation the MAGTF conducts.

**IO and Strategic Communications**

A command may confuse IO with Strategic Communications (SC). By joint definition SC are “focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” (JP 5-0) SC is planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power. It is designed to establish unity of US themes and messages, emphasize success, accurately confirm or refute external reporting on US operations, and reinforce the legitimacy of US goals. SC is an interagency effort. The predominant military activities that promote SC themes and messages are IO, Public Affairs (PA), and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD).

**Trends**

The Marine Corps Lesson Learn Center provides a formal mechanism for capturing lessons learned. Marines assigned to IO billets should spend time researching lessons learned on IO from the available data bases. Marines should also, during the time in an IO billet, maintain a log of lessons learned and trends that can be inputted into the Marine Corps lessons learned system or passed to future billet holders. Many lessons learned and trends will be classified in nature, but some common, unclassified trends are as follows:

- Commander’s End State often not considered, known, or understood, or only addresses the physical realm.
- Target Audience not identified or identified in such a general way as to be of little value.
- Though the physical battlespace is understood the Information Environment is not.
- Measures of Performance are frequently mistaken for Measures of Effectiveness.
Higher headquarters pushed themes that do not resonate well with local nationals.
- IO Cells are not properly manned or trained.
- There is a lack of IO understanding across the MAGTF staff.
- Having the staff coordinate for a unified message is difficult.
- There is a lack of Intel support for, and understanding of, IO.
- OPSEC can be problematic with staffs being lax in their awareness of protecting critical information or lacking interest in having a effective OPSEC program.
- CA-IO interaction can be difficult and uncoordinated.

**Bottom Line**

The world of the IO Planner is filled with all types of terms and acronyms, many of which are discussed in this handbook. Their meaning can often lead to endless debate and argument on theory and practice of IO. If the planner is not careful this debate can bog down planning efforts and stifle initiative. The IO Planner will have to work past any debate, and regardless of the academic discussion the bottom line for the IO Planner is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Bottom line for the IO Planner</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prepare</strong></td>
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| **Integrate** | Work with the staff and do not stovepipe IO planning.  
                     | Work within the limitations of time and resources placed on the staff, and within the planning and targeting process used by the command. |
| **Plan** | Understand who to influence, how, and why. Know that person’s environment.  
                     | Develop a description, verbally or graphically, of what IO can/will do to support the mission. Write so all can understand and work to get the description placed in a base order or FRAGO.  
                     | Build a plan that supports the maneuver on the ground. |
| **Execute** | Know how to transition an IO plan from the planning stage to the execution stage. |
| **Assess** | Be able to have some mechanism to evaluate action and adjust accordingly. |
Chapter 2

IO Intelligence Integration

Introduction

This chapter looks at IO Intelligence Integration (IOII) from an IO Planner’s point of view. Coordination, communication, and collaboration between the IO Planner and Intel Analyst are essential if IOII is to be realized. In order for this to succeed the IO Planner must establish a solid relationship with the Intel Analyst, who will be providing support to IO planning. This relationship should begin early in the planning process and be continual. As the relationship matures the IO Planner should become familiar with the Intelligence process and the Intel Analyst should become familiar with IO planning requirements and capabilities. Key information the IO Planner will need includes details on the information environment of the MAGTF’s area of operation (AO), and the identification and assessment of any person, persons, or group of people whose decisions can have an impact, either positively or negatively, on a Commander’s end state in the AO. This includes information on the human, technical, and infrastructure elements (physical dimension), that support the content and flow of information to and from a target audience (informational dimension), that affects key decisions (cognitive dimension). The assessment of target audiences includes an analysis of the communication networks, logistical, social, direct and indirect (active/passive) support, and financial networks that may have an impact on the individual’s or group’s decision making process.

IOII was formerly known as intelligence support to IO. The goal is to provide an analysis of the information environment with respect to IO (or through an “IO lens”) and how information is collected, processed, disseminated to target audiences, and used in the decision making process. IOII usually does not gather intelligence but rather uses existing intelligence resources to produce IO focused intelligence products that support the needs of the IO Planner. Intelligence is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of any IO Concept of Support. Intelligence support must begin early in any planning process in order to facilitate development of situational awareness of how information is collected, processed, disseminated, and exploited in the AO.

It is important for IO Planners to understand that limited intelligence resources, legal constraints, long lead times, and the dynamic nature of the information environment have an effect on IOII. The IO requirements are almost limitless while collection resources are limited. The information environment changes over time according to different factors. The intelligence needed to affect
a target audience’s decisions often require specific sources and methods to be positioned and employed over a long period of time to collect and analyze the needed information.

**Intel Analyst and IO Planner Relationship**

IO Planners and their supporting Intel Analysts should establish a process in which IO related Intel requirements are identified and when the products are needed by the planner. These products will act as “tools” that the IO Planner can use during the Marine Corps Planning Process, during the MAGTF targeting process, and during the coordination and integration required to execute an IO Concept of Support. A recommended process to use follows:

- At the beginning of any planning process, the IO Planner and Intel Analyst sit down and together determine what the requirements are, the type of information required, and when the information is needed by the planner.
  - Draft questions that both agree upon as a good starting point. Questions should act as a guide for the analyst to use when researching the information environment.
  - Establish the format on how the information will be provided.
  - Agree on time restraints and when the information is needed.
  - Agree on the classification level of the material.
  - Understand that Intel provided will be addressed through an “IO Lens.”
- Throughout the product development process both the IO Planner and Intel Analyst should meet regularly to discuss progress, make adjustments, and review requirements.
- The information provided should be continually updated and the IO Planner and Intel Analyst should establish when reviews and updates are conducted.

IO Planners and Intel Analysts coordinate, communicate, and collaborate throughout the process. The constant cycle of inputs, analysis, and feedback should result in a solid understanding of both target audiences and their information environment. This means that trends, strengths, vulnerabilities, considerations, and intelligence gaps have been identified. In the end the IO Planner should have the information needed on the target audience(s) and the significant characteristics of the information environment that will assist in the development of an effective IO Concept of Support.
Request for Information

A request for information (RFI) is defined as any specific, time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A RFI can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with established MAGTF procedures.

If the IO Planner or Intel Analyst cannot answer intelligence or information requirements with existing resources, then they must generate an RFI. Before doing so, however, they must ensure that the RFI cannot be satisfied at their level. The IO Planner, working with his Intel representative, will need to use the format and follow the procedure established by the MAGTF when submitting an RFI. Regardless of the format an IO Planner should know the basic fundamentals on how to write and submit an RFI. Considerations in writing a RFI are:

- Clearly and in detail (focus) articulate the requirement.
- Justify the request.
- Provide the latest time information is of value (LTIOV), in other words when the information is needed.
- Recommend the desired format of the information.
- Provide the highest classification level of the information (this is critical if the information is to be shared with Allies).

Analyzing the Information Environment

The operational environment is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander. The Marine Corps uses the term “battlespace environment.” This space encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains. It also includes the information environment.

An in-depth understanding of both the flow of information and the actions taken in the three dimensions of the information environment is a must in order for effective planning to proceed and to be successful. IO Planners and Intel Analysts must learn as much as they can prior to the start of any planning effort and continually improve their knowledge throughout the planning and execution of an operation. Part of that understanding is being able to:
• Identify the key actors who are using or exploiting the information environment.
• Determine their capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses within the information environment.
• Describe how they are using and exploiting the information environment.
• Describe how these actors can either have a positive or negative effect on a MAGTF’s mission.
• Recommend which key actors should be targeted, thus becoming the MAGTF’s target audiences.

Identifying the target audience comes from an assessment of the information environment. Once the target audience is identified, then the IO Planner and Intel Analyst must assess the information environment from the target audience’s point of view. In doing so, analyze the audience’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities and compare them against friendly strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. This will expose opportunities that could be exploited, while at the same time identifying vulnerabilities that may need to be protected.

Ultimately targeting a selected audience will be based on who the commander has decided to place resources against in order to achieve a result that will support his end state. Resources include the material, systems, personnel, and time employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate information. How the target will be engaged will be based on relationships to other actors, and variables such as history, religion, family, and culture.
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<th><strong>Key Questions</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Cognitive Dimension</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What do the individual or individuals believe</td>
<td>• Mind set of those who can influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How did the individual or individuals develop that belief</td>
<td>• Core beliefs resulting from ideology and culture, perceptions of others, and the impact of current or historical events</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What decisions will an individual or individuals decide to make</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Informational Dimension</strong></td>
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<td>• What does the information say</td>
<td>• Content: Truths, propaganda, rumors, disinformation, misinformation, themes, storylines, talking points, images that support goals of a group or individual, organization’s critical information</td>
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<td>• What method is used to pass the information</td>
<td>• Flow: Written word, spoken word, radio/TV broadcast, internet, billboard messages, images, graffiti</td>
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<td>• What format is the information in when it is passed to an audience</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Dimension</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Who are the key individuals that have an influence in the AO</td>
<td>• Key individuals: Leaders, their advisors, family members</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Which human networks have an influence in the AO</td>
<td>• Human networks: Tribal, religious, families, business, governmental, educational, security, informants</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What technical infrastructure is available to produce, process, receive, send, and store information</td>
<td>• Technical: Computers, printing presses, radios, antennas, cameras, control panels, C2 systems, internet</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What physical infrastructure houses, supports, and/or protects personnel and equipment dealing with information</td>
<td>• Physical: Media centers, Universities and schools, bunkers, Gov/Medical/phone facilities Religious/Financial institutions</td>
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Key questions and examples for the information environment
IO Related Intel Products

There are several different types of Intel products which can assist the IO Planner. Which product is developed will be based on the needs of the planning effort and in discussion between the IO Planner and the Intel Analyst. The IO Planner should understand the Intelligence process with which the Intel Analyst will be involved with. The process used to develop intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. The Marine Corps intelligence cycle consists of six sequential yet interdependent steps: planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; production; dissemination; and utilization.

![Marine Corps intelligence cycle diagram]

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

An Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. There is no such thing as an “IO IPB” as discussed in some parts of the IO community. A command has one IPB in which IO related information is added. Preparing and refining the IPB is one of the “on-going activities” during every step of the Marine Corps Planning Process. The IPB process has four steps:
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<th>IPB Step</th>
<th>IO Focus</th>
<th>Some IO Considerations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td>Define the Battlespace Environment</td>
<td>• Identify significant characteristics of the information environment in terms of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Define the information environment</td>
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<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td>Describe the Battlespace Effects</td>
<td>• Analyze each significant characteristic in detail.</td>
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<td>Describe the information environment's effects</td>
<td>• Combine the significant characteristics to develop aggregate effects for the information environment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify sub-information environments</td>
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<td>• Identify information nodes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Determine info content and flow in the AO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Plot analysis to create a Combined Information Overlay (CIO).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
<td>Evaluate the Adversary</td>
<td>• Ability to exploit the adversary’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Evaluate the adversary's use of information</td>
<td>• Who makes decisions and their decision making process.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ability to make accurate and timely decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ability of an adversary to collect, protect, and project information.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ability of key decision maker’s to affect MAGTF’s endstate.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 4</strong></td>
<td>Determine Adversary COAs</td>
<td>• Determine what decisions may be made.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Determine adversary COAs in the information environment</td>
<td>• Determine where, when, and how the adversary will seek information superiority.</td>
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Variables

While developing the IO related information for an IPB, the IO Planner, along with the Intel analyst may use several tools to support the analysts.

- **PMESII-PT**: Analysis of the battlespace environment in terms of the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—provides relevant information that senior commanders use to understand, visualize, and describe the battlespace environment.
- **METT-T**: Analysis of the battlespace environment in terms of the mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available—that directly affect a mission. They outline the situation as it applies to a specific unit. The Army uses METT-TC, adding civil considerations as the last item.
- **ASCOPE**: Analysis of the battlespace environment in terms of civil considerations variable—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events—that provide the ability to analyze their impact on operations.

**METT-TC**

IO should be viewed as an element of combat power to be focused when and where actions can develop an operational advantage that best supports MAGTF operations. To develop an operational/tactical advantage the MAGTF must understand the characteristics of the information environment in its operational area, and how an adversary and third party organizations use information to support achievement of their objectives. Many of the principles and concepts that guide the conduct of other military operations also guide the employment of IO. METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations) can be used as a technique for commanders and staff to integrate IO into operations. This can be used as a framework for an IPB. If so, IO considerations for METT-TC can include:

- **Mission**: How IO will support the MAGTF’s mission and how it is expected to achieve an operational advantage over an adversary.
- **Enemy**: How an adversary will leverage information within the information environment. This will include an adversary’s capability to conduct information activities and his strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities in doing so. It will include what decisions an adversary may make based on the content and flow of information.
received. It will also look at the adversary’s ability to protect his critical information, collect information he needs, and project his information to others in order to persuade them to support his goals.

- **Terrain and Weather:** How Terrain and weather will affect information content and flow and the employment of IO capabilities. Terrain and weather affect both human and technical communications networks. Military forces should adjust the employment of IO to the terrain and impact of weather (to include seasonal).

- **Troops and Support Available:** How available troops and the support can affect information content and flow. Any unit can impact the information environment through specific or bold actions that convey a specific message to a designated target audience. The precept follows the anecdote that “Actions speak louder than words.” A message is not delivered nor perceived solely through verbal or written means. Observable actions can send a direct or indirect message to specific individuals or target audiences. Key is that actions must match the command message (theme). Additionally, HHQ, adjacent units, supporting units, and subordinate units may have production or delivery capabilities that can affect information content and flow to either friendly or adversarial target audiences.

- **Time Available:** How time impacts the ability to effectively deliver a message and assess its impact. Included in this are lead times to develop requirements, conduct coordination, and get higher headquarters approval, even before a message can be delivered. This is followed by the time needed to assess the effectiveness of the message on the target audience. This must be compared to time available to the MAGTF to conduct an operation in order to determine what is and is not feasible. In addition, the local customs and the local concept of time need to be considered. To offset less time available the IO Concept of Support may require more direct actions in the information environment or increase the frequency or types of information engagements. Typically, IO must be planned one phase or event in advance of fire and maneuver.

- **Civil Considerations:** How society and culture considerations may impact efforts to influence a target audience, and how those considerations can be leveraged to support the MAGTF. These considerations should not be limited to the local population, but to adversary forces as well. The focus will be how these considerations support the close fight (attainment of unit objectives) and the long range (deep battle) effort to develop a local situation that permits re-allocation of forces or withdrawal from the AO.
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

A Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is an analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. If a MAGTF Commander chooses to use the JIPOE process then it should include IO related information on the information environment and target audiences. The JIPOE has four major steps:

- Defining the total operational environment
- Describing the impact of the operational environment
- Evaluating the adversary
- Determining and describing adversary potential courses of action (COAs)

The process is used to analyze the physical domains (air, land, maritime and space); the information environment; political, military, economic, social information; and infrastructure (PMESII) systems; and all other relevant aspects of the operational environment, and to determine an adversary’s capabilities to operate within that environment.

Planners need to be of aware of the difference between IPB and JIPOE: there is none. The Joint world does IPOE, while service-level units do IPB. The steps, logic, products and relationship to planning are essentially the same. For example, the JTF J-2 will publish an JIPOE, and then the MAGTF G-2 will refine much of the same information in preparing the MAGTF’s IPB products.
Combined Information Overlay

A Combined Information Overlay (CIO) is a graphic visualization tool that depicts the significant characteristics of the information environment and its effects on military operations. In the IPB process a CIO is part of the first and second steps. In the JIPOE a CIO is part of the second step that looks at developing a geospatial perspective when describing the impact of the operational environment. IO Planners will find a CIO of value during the Problem Framing step of the Marine Corps Planning Process (see chapter 3 of this Handbook) as it can provide a graphic portrayal of the significant characteristics and actions in the information environment that will need to be addressed during the planning process. The information derived from a CIO can be incorporated into either an IPB or JIPOE, whichever process the MAGTF is using.

CIO development must begin as early as possible in the planning process and be continually updated. A CIO examines the significant characteristics and effects of the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions on friendly, neutral, and adversary forces. It can be used to identify strengths and/or vulnerabilities of the information environment that can be exploited by friendly or adversary forces. In order for it to be a useful tool, the IO Planner must collaborate closely with the Intel Analyst, throughout the construction of the CIO.

Information that is not readily available, but is necessary to help build the CIO, is identified by the IO Planner and submitted to the intelligence staff as an RFI. Once all the necessary information is obtained, the Intel Analyst, in coordination with the IO Planner, finalizes the CIO and makes it available for IO planning or target development. It is critical to understand that the success of this step requires the coordination and cooperation of the Intel Analyst and IO Planner working in conjunction with each other towards a common goal.

There is no standard format for a CIO, although the Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (dated 16 June 2009) provides an example of how a CIO could look (figure II-11 on page II-33). CIOs can be done using the layering system provided by a geographic information system (GIS). They can also be done via power point, though graphically depicting a multi-dimensional environment via power point can be challenging.

Below is an example of a format for a standalone CIO power point slide showing information sub-environments.
Some techniques to consider if developing a power point CIO:

- A CIO brief may consist of numerous slides, but the IO Planner should look to have one, maybe two slides that could be pulled to act as standalone slides. These would give an overview and could be used, for example, in Problem Framing briefs. The bulk of the brief would provide the details for the overview slides. See Annex C for questions to consider for each dimension when developing a CIO.

- The CIO could look at the information environment in a holistic manner, or divide it into two or more information sub-environments. Information sub-environments are areas in which the information environment characteristics and effects are notably different from those of adjacent areas. These information sub-environments could be considered as compartmentalized or restricted areas of information flow due to geographic features and/or cultural differences. The use of information sub-environments will depend on
how the Intel Analyst and IO Planners assess the impact of information content and flow in each of the different geographical areas within the AO.

- A standalone CIO slide will need to provide the critical information for each dimension of the information environment or information sub-environments. Critical information is defined as significant characteristics or capabilities that must be addressed during the planning process or risk mission failure. The CIO should also provide an overall assessment, or graphic, that depicts the major strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of the adversary. It can include recommendations on how to exploit or preserve current conditions, as well as other IO planning considerations. A map showing the information environment or information sub-environments as well as a legend will need to be included. The map may show additional highlights of the physical dimension, as appropriate. Key is the ability to identify the supporting resources (references) that substantiate the findings of key or significant characteristics in the information environment that require command attention (allocation of time or resources) during the planning process.

Depending on the requirement, a CIO may or may not be needed. Regardless of the requirement, an IO Planner, as well as the Intel Analyst, must be able to articulate the information environment in planning activities.

**Target Audience Analysis**

A Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is a detailed and comprehensive examination of selected groups and/or individuals to determine how best to influence their decisions or behaviors so they are favorable for the MAGTF’s endstate. A target audience needs to be identified as early as possible in the planning process and continually refined throughout. See Annex C for questions to consider when developing target audiences.

Once a target audience has been identified, then methods on how to engage in order to support a course of action can be determined. The US Army (MISO) uses a Target Audience Analysis Worksheet (TAAW) for assessing a target audience and deciding how and which products would be best to engage that audience. This worksheet will help define the target audience and its primary decision-making characteristics.

Normally TAAWs are developed by trained MISO Marines or Soldiers, but if neither is available the IO Planner working with the Intel Analyst may have to complete this worksheet. Even if
trained personnel are available, the IO Planner should stay completely engaged on who the target audiences are since they play a dominant role in planning MAGTF activities in the information environment.

Filling out a TAAW involves an eight step process. The Army does use a standard TAAW format, though IO Planners, working in the absence of MISO support, are not bound by that format. Additional information on the TAAW can be found in Annex D.

- Identify and refine target audience
- Determine effectiveness
- Identify conditions
- Identify vulnerabilities
- Determine susceptibility
- Determine accessibility
- Develop MISO arguments and recommend actions
- Refine assessment criteria

The completed TAAW helps identify and prioritize the key audience characteristics to be considered during the planning and targeting processes. Once produced it will assist in determining which methods will have the best chance of influencing a selected audience. The TAAW must be updated on a frequent basis until there is a change in the desired effect or achievement of the end state is realized. Since conditions and vulnerabilities within any audience are continually changing, the IO Planner and Intel Analyst will need to continually review, refine, and update the worksheet.

**Assessment of the Media Environment**

One of the most popular areas of interest for IO Planners is the media environment that affects their MAGTF’s AO. The media, news, literary and social networking sites play a vital role in any society. The media and other information networks increasing availability to society’s leadership, population, and infrastructure can have a profound impact on national will, political direction, and national security objectives and policy. IO Planners and Intel Analysts must understand the role of the media and perceptions it can create. An examination of the literary media must also be undertaken as literature itself conveys important (and exploitable) themes, symbols, and myths of that culture and society. The result of this research can be included in a
CIO or some other Intel product supporting IO planning, or it can be produced as a standalone product or brief.

Historically the types of understanding IO Planners try to gain on the media include propagation (quality and reach) of radio or TV signals, areas of distribution of media products, market share of different media outlets, perceptions of trustworthiness, and political/social leanings. None of this information is easily obtained. The more remote the region, the harder access to information on the media will be. The IO Planner will have to work with the Intel Analyst to determine collection assets available to obtain an understanding of the media environment. It will be important to note the difference between what is posted for local, regional, and international audiences. Understanding the media environment not only will give an insight into the cultural aspects of a region, but will give an IO Planner an understanding of what the different groups in the AO want. In today’s world, insurgents, political parties, non-profit organizations, business, etc., will tell the world what they stand for, their ideology, their principles, and their goals; all the IO Planner and IO Intel Analyst have to do is listen. That is, if the assets are available to collect it. The IO Planner and Intel Analyst should consider using a combination of classified and open sources. Open sources can be especially useful as long as the political leaning or ideology of the source is understood and taken into account.

By doctrine the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) should be the lead in media assessment. At a minimum the PAO must be an active participant in any assessment of the media environment, although manpower constraints may limit the amount of time available. The PAO should be kept completely informed of all work and end products that assess the media environment regardless of the degree of involvement in the development of a particular assessment.

It is recommended that when conducting an assessment of any media environment that the assessment be conducted in three parts. The first looks at the infrastructure that supports the
media, the second is an analysis of the content of the media, and the third, the impact of that content on selected audiences. Some considerations:

- **Infrastructure (Physical Dimension)** includes the physical locations of media outlets as well as who owns them, the political leanings of the owners, cultural biases, the networks needed to obtain their news stories, who writes and edits them, and the distribution networks. It also can include the supplies and hardware needed to run an outlet, and the actual ability of the outlet to send its product and of its intended audiences to receive it. An outlet can be for radio, TV, print, and internet. Types of media include mainstream news and publications that have a moderate or large audiences and special interest publications and products that target certain groups within the society or communities. See Annex E for questions that can be asked when looking at the media infrastructure.

- **Content (Informational Dimension)** includes an analysis of what is actually being said through broadcasts, the written word, and/or images. This can be centered on a single event, but for a complete understanding a body of work needs to be assessed in order to fully determine themes and narratives. See Annex F for a discussion on dominant narratives.

- **The impact (Cognitive Dimension)** of that content on selected audiences includes an assessment of who receives the information, what that audience believes, or could believe, about themes or narratives being pushed, as well as their perceptions of the originator. The content’s originator and any biases should also be addressed.

A typical media analysis can answer the following questions:

- How do the media frame public discussion of an issue (by repeating various story elements, using common metaphors, quoting similar people, etc.)?
- Who are the main spokespeople on a particular topic, and how are they being quoted? Are they mainly advocates, policymakers, academic experts, etc.?
- How often are various spokespeople quoted and in what context?
- What topics are being covered, and what topics are being ignored?
- Which news outlets are covering or ignoring a storyline or an organization that based on the current situation they could be covering?
- Is there a time of year when an issue or organization is more likely to be covered than others?
What is the placement of a topic or organization in a particular media? Is a topic or organization front-page/top-of-the-broadcast news, and if not, where/when covered?

Which reporters are writing on this issue/organization?

What messages are being used?

Are there indicators that can help measures of effectiveness of friendly and adversary information activities or goals?

There are numerous methodologies available to assess the media. Below is an example of one method:

- Develop search terms and a list of news outlets which will be the focus of the sample.
- Examine articles/broadcast from a set time-frame, usually about six months. A manageable sample for a typical media analysis is between 100 and 200 stories.
- Once the sample is drawn and articles/broadcasts are read closely, classified by type--opinion, news, or feature.
  - Opinion pieces can be letters to the editor, op-eds, columns, or editorials.
  - News pieces are straightforward articles which report on the latest events in the world.
  - Feature stories are usually more in-depth pieces, sometimes lighter pieces, and often profile stories.
- Note the placement within the source, time when the story ran, the type of headline used and the main themes stressed in the stories.
- Note whoever is quoted about a particular issue within a news story as that has an impact on how that issue is portrayed to the public.
- Determine how the story is framed. Frames reflect a specific viewpoint or mindset. An analysis of how a story is framed involves looking at a story’s content and seeing how reporters connect its topic to the archetypal stories that already exist within peoples’ minds.

**IOII Appendix in Operational Orders**

For an operation plan or order IOII information is found in Appendix 6 to Annex B (Intelligence). Format for this appendix has not been developed or shown in Marine Corps references. The MAGTF may dictate the format. Information provided in a CIO should be included in this appendix.
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Chapter 3

IO and the Marine Corps Planning Process

Introduction

Information Operations are planned as part of MAGTF operations using the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP). The MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process is the primary reference Marine IO Planners will follow when involved in MAGTF planning activities. An IO Planner must understand the process as outlined in the MCWP 5-1 before integrating IO into any planning effort. The following discussion is intended to provide guidance to an IO Planner on how to integrate IO into the planning process and what kind of information will be required.

The planning process serves as a tool to assist the commander and staff in developing a single integrated plan to fulfill the unit mission. The MCPP follows a detailed and deliberate methodology that supports the commander’s decisionmaking. The process is applicable across the range of military operations and is designed for use at any echelon of command. It can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation permit. A commander may initiate planning on his own initiative, based on indications and warnings, or in response to specific guidance and direction from higher headquarters. The planning process is designed to promote understanding among the commander and his staff regarding the nature of a given problem and the options for solving it. The plans which result may be considered hypotheses which will be tested and refined as a result of execution and assessment. MCPP is a six step process.

Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process
IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of operational planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. Information Operations are used in all phases of a campaign or operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence the amount of effort required for the remaining phases.

![IO and the Marine Corps Planning Process](image)

**Operational Planning Team**

The planning process is often conducted through an Operational Planning Team (OPT). An OPT is a dynamic, ad hoc organization formed by either the future plans division or future operations center to conduct integrated planning. Time allotted for the conduct of the OPT will depend on
the mission requirements. The OPT may meet periodically over a long period of time or meet continuously over a short period.

Normally, the OPT is built around a core group of planners from either the future plans division or future operations center, and will include members from different MAGTF staff sections. When assigned to an OPT, the OPT becomes the primary place of duty of the core planners and working through the planning process becomes their primary duty. The OPT may also be augmented by warfighting function representatives, liaison officers, and subject matter experts needed to support planning. As required, the OPT leader will integrate additional staff representatives to support the planning process. The OPT leader, based on the commander’s guidance, will control the tempo of the OPT and as such will set the schedule and define the requirements for OPT members. He will rely primarily on core members to work through the process and develop a plan that meets the Commander’s requirements.

IO Planners should be required to participate in the OPT, preferably as a core member of the OPT. The true value of the IO Planners is providing unique functional perspective to the overall planning effort. In working with the OPT it is best for the IO Planner to establish a good working relationship with the OPT leader, provide input as directed and when directed, be able to quickly articulate IO support, and have the ability to back up IO support with details.

Depending on manpower availability, the IO Planner may have to work independently with the OPT or rely on the IO Cell for support. Either way, any IO objectives, IO tasks, IO related CCIRs, etc. identified must be accepted by the OPT for inclusion into the overall plan. In order to be truly effective IO input must be integrated early into the overall operations order development and approved by the Commander.

There may be times when the IO Planner may lead an OPT to meet mission requirements. Any plans resulting from an IO led OPT must be approved by the commander in order for them to receive the necessary support.

**Preparation for Planning**

An IO Planner must prepare prior to the start of the planning process. One of the first things a planner should do is to gain an understanding of the requirements. When determining requirements the first place the IO Planner should turn to is the IO Officer or IO Staff at the next higher echelon. The Planner should obtain the IO endstate, target audiences, IO limitation, IO concept of support, IO guidance, authorities, themes, etc. of the next two higher echelons.
Understanding authorities, approval processes, and being “read-in” as appropriate, should all be done prior to planning.

The Planner must also conduct preparatory work with Intel Analysts to ensure both parties are synchronized with the Intelligence requirements needed to understand the information environment of the area of operation. Through coordination with the Intel Analysts the foundation for IO related Intel products, such as a Combined Information Overlay (CIO), will be laid. Work on these products will be continual with the information in these products being continually updated and assessed throughout the planning process. The IO Planner, working with the Intel Analyst, must ensure he is always aware of the content of the products. The planner must also remember that often long lead times may be required in order for the Intel Analyst to conduct the proper research for a sound product. A planner can expect discussion of the information environment early in the planning process, during the initial phases of Problem Framing. As such, the planner must be able to articulate the key points of each dimension of the information environment.

In addition, both the IO Planner and Analyst will begin a list of IO related Intel gaps that become Requests for Information (RFI). This list of RFIs must be updated at every stage of the planning process, as there will be several occasions where it may be briefed or discussed.

Step 1: Problem Framing

The first step in the MCPP is Problem Framing. The purpose of Problem Framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. The goal is to widen the lens beyond focusing on an enemy when assessing the situation. This greater understanding allows a commander to visualize the operation and describe his conceptual approach, providing context for the examination of what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation.

The initial phase of this step involves understanding the environment and understanding the problem, of which one of the items to consider is the information environment. Understanding the environment provides background information, facts, status, connections, relevant actors, habitat, local beliefs, and a broad range of other factors that serve as a context for the command and his staff to better understand the problem. Armed with an appreciation of the environment the OPT or staff can have a discussion to reveal the underlying nature of the problem and point to possible solutions. The preliminary work the IO Planner will have done with the Intel Analyst will be critical in supporting the discussion during this phase.
**Understanding the environment**
- Design results from HHQ
- Available intelligence products
- Information environment
- Culture
- Language
- Demographics
- Religion
- Geography
- Local economics
- Key actors
- Tendencies
- Relationships
- Potential
- Security
- Climate
- Time

**Understanding the problem**
- Existing design results from HHQ
- Adversary
- Friendly force update
- Information environment
- Terrain and weather
- Troops and support available
- Civil considerations
- Difference between conditions
- Limitations
- Assumptions
- Specified tasks
- Initial staff estimates
- Input from other commanders
- Experience and judgment
- Range of potential actions
- Tempo

Understand the environment, the problem from MCWP 5-1 under Problem Framing

The mechanics of how this step will be actually conducted will be based on the guidance of the commander or his OPT lead. The IO Planner must be able to conform to this guidance in order to be value added to the process. The actions for this process, in which the IO Planner will participate, may include a commander’s orientation, a discussion aimed at understanding the environment and the problem, the commander providing initial guidance and intent, the conduct of a problem framing brief, the development of the commander’s course of action guidance, and the issuing of a warning order.

During this step the IO Planner will be required to provide input in order to help the commander understand the problem and then consider possible solutions. This input may come in a variety of forms to include discussions, recommendations, and briefs. The commander or OPT leader will set the requirements of what each planner is required to produce, when, and in what format. The IO Planner should not be afraid to recommend additional requirements that may be of value to the commander or OPT.

During Problem Framing the IO Planner should be prepared to identify and discuss:
- IO related facts, assumptions, tasks, and limitations.
- Potential key actors that may become target audiences.
- Friendly related IO assets that are available or those identified as a shortfall.
- IO related points as they apply to a Center of Gravity analysis.
- What objectives IO can accomplish.

The planner must also be prepared to make recommendations for IO related CCIRs, if any, as well as make recommendations for IO input to the commander’s intent, warning order, and course of action (COA) guidance, if solicited by the commander.

By the end of the Problem Framing step, the IO Planner should have developed an initial IO estimate, formulated an initial IO Concept of Support, and worked with the Intel Analyst on updating any IO related Intel products. Finally the IO Planner should be prepared to provide input to the Problem Framing brief.

**IO Related Facts**

Identify relevant physical, informational, and cognitive properties (friendly, adversarial, or neutral/third party) of the information environment that may impact the operation. An IO Planner should focus on those facts that are related to IO’s function, targeting decision makers. Keep the number of facts manageable in order to maintain focus. Each fact identified should ideally have relevance – the “so what?” A recommended means of organizing IO related facts is as follows:

- Facts related to the physical dimension.
- Facts related to the informational dimension.
- Facts related to the cognitive dimension.
- Facts related to friendly IO capabilities.
- Facts related to adversarial information activities.

**IO Related Tasks**

Every mission consists of two elements: the task(s) to be accomplished by one’s force and their purpose. When developing IO related tasks, it will be important for the planner to identify higher echelon requirements. This may come directly from higher headquarters orders or from
deducing requirements by analyzing orders or directives. It is important for the IO Planner to identify those tasks that are essential for achieving the commander’s end state, while at the same time keeping the number manageable. In this stage the IO Planner should not develop a task for an IO capability. That discussion will come later in the planning process. Ultimately all tasks must be accomplished, but time, resources, and competing non-IO requirements may have an impact on the ability to execute tasks. If multiple tasks are identified, then they should be prioritized. This is normally accomplished by the sequence when the tasks are briefed. There are three types of tasks IO Planners will need to identify: specified, implied, and essential.

Specified tasks are those assigned by higher headquarters, either through higher headquarter’s orders or commander’s guidance. If the higher headquarter’s task contains an IO effect or objective, these may be taken as specified tasks assigned to the command.

Implied tasks are not stated or assigned by a higher headquarters, but are necessary to accomplish the mission. They are derived from an analysis of specified tasks, own commander’s guidance, higher headquarters orders, the situation on the ground, the course of action decision makers may take, and an analysis of the information environment of the area of operations. Since implied tasks are deduced from detailed analysis they should be limited to those considered critical to the accomplishment of the mission.

Essential tasks are those tasks, selected by the OPT from the specified and implied tasks, that must be performed to achieve overall mission success. MAGTF essential tasks become part of the MAGTF mission statement. Generally three to five essential tasks will be selected during the planning process, so inclusion of any IO related essential task will require a solid justification by the IO Planner. The IO Planner will need to look at those IO related specified and implied tasks to determine if there are any IO essential tasks. An IO essential task must be one that affects a target audience in a way that supports the command’s mission. There is the possibility that an IO Planner will identify an essential IO task, but that task will not be included in the command’s essential tasks list. The IO Planner should look to link the IO essential task to a MAGTF task to ensure it can be accomplished. Essential IO related tasks form the basis for the IO Estimate and perhaps any IO Objective, and will be included in the IO Appendix. They do not become part of an “IO mission statement.” There is no “IO mission,” in accordance with the 24 August 2010 MCWP 5-1 (page K-39). The only mission is the MAGTF’s mission. The IO Planner will need to focus on the MAGTF essential tasks or specified or implied tasks singled out by the OPT leader or commander.
The IO Planner should also be on the lookout for tasks that are not IO specific, but will need IO support in order to be accomplished. These would be tasks identified by other members of the OPT or staff.

**Identification of Potential Target Audiences (Key Actors)**

As early in the process as feasible, potential target audiences should be identified. Targets may be an individual or a group of people. Key will be identifying those audiences that if time, effort, and resources are going to be applied towards influencing them, then the decisions they make will support the accomplishment of the mission. Certain tasks may identify an audience. Other audiences may be identified through an analysis of the information environment. Which audience to target may not be initially clear and as the planning process continues, selected audiences may need to be adjusted. Some planners may not be comfortable with using the term “target” during the Problem Framing process, reasoning it is too early in the process to classify someone as a target. At this stage other terms may be used, such as key actors (term used in MCWP 5-1 under Problem Framing, understanding the environment). Regardless of the term used during problem framing, the key is to identify a person or persons whose decisions will have an impact, either positively or negatively, on the commander’s end state. As the planning process matures, these “key actors” may become the command’s target audience towards which time, effort, and resources are applied in order to affect their decisions. Ultimately the decision making ability of these audiences will become the key element on which all IO plans will be focused.

![Diagram of the planning process](image-url)

Developing target audiences during MCPP
Some individuals may be considered high value individuals (HVIs) whose actions against will be discussed as part of the targeting process. How this will be handled will depend on the MAGTF’s targeting process. See Chapter 4 of this handbook for more on IO and the targeting process.

**IO Related Assumptions**

An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action (Joint Pub 1-02).

Assumptions apply to the friendly, neutral, and adversary ability to operate within the information environment. An assumption replaces necessary, but missing or unknown facts. A valid assumption has three characteristics. It must be logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. There may be few or no assumptions made early in the planning, but more may be developed more as planning continues. If all possible, assumptions should be resolved before the execution of the plan/order.

The IO Planner should identify the fewest possible assumptions necessary for planning. IO related assumptions made by higher headquarters must be treated as facts. The IO Planner should challenge those IO planning assumptions that he, or the IO cell, non-concurs with. The IO Planner must be careful not to assume away the ability of an adversary to leverage an information activity.

**IO Limitations**

There are two types of limitations an IO Planner must deal with, constraints and restraints. A constraint is an action that is required to done, while a restraint is an action that cannot be done. IO limitations may include legal, moral, social, operational, and/or political. Different authorities above the MAGTF may dictate the requirements needed to employ different IO capabilities. Limitations may be found in, but not limited to, higher headquarters orders and guidance, published rules and regulations for military commands, laws of the host country, approved rules of engagements, and command stand operating procedures. An IO Planner can quickly become afool of legal issues if the limitations are not properly understood, so it is imperative that the command’s SJA be involved in IO planning at an early stage.
Identification of Friendly Related IO Assets

During the Problem Framing Step the IO Planner begins to assess what capabilities are available in order to support the assigned tasks. In doing so the IO Planner should identify organic and supporting abilities. It will be important for the IO Planner not to get trapped by looking only at doctrinal IO capabilities, but instead to consider anything that can legally be used to influence a target audience.

Remember the IO Planner owns no assets and must work with the staff to ensure capabilities are available to support IO tasking. The IO Planner must list out what is available at the Planner’s echelon, and at higher and subordinate echelons. Use of assets from higher echelons will need to be formally requested by the command. Approval is not guaranteed. Likewise, assets of subordinated units will need to be properly tasked during the order development phases. Assets that are not available, but required will need to be identified as a shortfall. Higher echelon assets, until requested and approved for use, should also be listed as a shortfall.

The IO Planner, when determining assets, should consider these questions:

- What can IO do using the command’s organic assets (to include those with subordinate echelons)?
- What can IO do using the supporting assets from higher headquarters?

IO Related Points to a Center of Gravity Analysis

Ideally, a Center of Gravity (COG) analysis is done prior to the start of the planning process, though based on time available and the situation it may be conducted as part of the Problem Framing process. Both friendly and adversary COGs will be developed in order to determine weaknesses that may become a critical vulnerability. The COG is analyzed within a framework of three critical factors:

- Critical Capabilities (CC): those that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the friendly objective(s) or an adversary’s assumed objective(s).
- Critical Requirements (CR): those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.
- Critical vulnerabilities (CV): those aspects or components of a CR which are deficient, or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results.
IO Planners, working with Intel Analysts supporting IO should look at the CVs and analyze them via each of the three dimensions within the information environment. What is assessed should be included in COG discussions with the OPT.

**Recommend IO Input for the Commander’s Intent**

During the Problem Framing phase the commander will issue his guidance and intent. This guidance and intent may include IO considerations. If given the opportunity, the IO Planner may be able to make recommended input for inclusion of IO related issues. By influencing the commander’s intent early in the planning, the IO Planner will have an easier time coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing IO capabilities later in the planning process due to the increased command emphasis on critical IO effects and activities.

**Recommend IO Related CCIRs**

A Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) is defined as information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision making. Only the commander decides what information is critical, but will usually make that decision based on recommendations from his staff or from the OPT. If there is IO related information that is critical, then the IO Planner should recommend it be included as one of the CCIRs. The planner must be able to clearly articulate justification for this recommendation.

Throughout the planning process, the IO Planner identifies the information needed to accomplish the information operation. Working with the Intel Analyst and other planners, significant gaps on what is known about potential target audiences and the information environment may be identified. These gaps are formulated into intelligence requirements (IRs). All staff sections may recommend IRs for designation as priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). A PIR is defined as “an IR stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment.” (JP 1-02) The G2/S2 has overall staff responsibility for consolidating PIR nominations and for making an overall staff recommendation to the commander regarding their approval. PIR, along with Friendly force information requirements (FFIR), become CCIRs.
IO Objective

During the Problem Framing Process the IO Planner should develop the IO Objective. An IO Objective clearly defines attainable goals which IO is expected to accomplish in order to support the MATFG’s mission. Attaining these goals will provide the commander with an operational advantage. The IO objective will identify general target audiences, why they are important to achieving the Commander’s intent, and what general means will be used to influence, or protect, those audiences. It may change based on the phase of the operation. It is developed during Problem Framing and included as part of the IO Estimate. It will be refined as needed throughout the planning process.

There may be more than one IO Objective. The actual number of number of IO Objectives developed should be kept to a minimum. Too many objectives will become unmanageable and expectations on executing them will be unrealistic based on the limited time and resources a commander will have available.

An IO Objective can be written many ways depending on the requirements of the OPT:

- In bullet form, listing a purpose, general method, and end state.
- As a narrative in written or graphic format that can be used in base orders, FRAGOs, and/or as a means to describe the IO concept of support.

The IO Objective can be used in the Problem Framing brief, in the warning order, as a narrative in the base order, and as means to describe the IO Concept of Support. A narrative can be in a written or graphic format.

IO Objectives cannot be developed in a vacuum. They must be developed in conjunction with other planning actions being developed by an OPT or G3/S3. They must be accepted by the OPT, the G3/S3, and commander if they are to be taken seriously and included in the overall plan that is wargamed and approved at the end of the COA process.

Achieving the end state of an IO Objective means that actions, either lethal or non-lethal, impacted the behavioral state of the target audience. This impact resulted in the changing of a behavior so the target audience(s) makes a decision that helps the MAGTF accomplish its mission. How to assess this achievement should be developed as early as possible in the planning process. (See page 5-3 for more information on MOEs).
Initial IO Staff Estimate

During the planning process the IO Planner will be required to produce a staff estimate for IO. The estimate is one of the primary means of informing the commander of the IO Planner’s assessment of the information environment and how IO can, or cannot, support the commander’s mission requirements. An initial estimate is developed during Problem Framing and is continuously updated throughout the planning process. An estimate provides a timely examination of factors that support a commander’s decision making and can affect mission accomplishment. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the estimate could be a formal, detailed written document, or an informal verbal briefing. The format will more than likely be dictated by the OPT leader or the commander. Estimates are used to help in the development of courses of action. During the COA process the estimate is continually updated and refined. At the end of the process the estimate, as well as the concept of support, contribute to the development of Appendix 3 (Information Operations), Annex C. See Annex G of this handbook for examples of staff estimates.

The IO staff estimate may include the following:

- Identification of target audiences.
- An overview of the information environment of adversary, neutral, and friendly target audiences.
- List of IO related assumptions.
- List of IO related tasks.
- List of IO related limitations.
- Recommended IO input to the commander’s intent, warning order, and CCIRs.
- COA analysis, comparison, and recommendations from an IO perspective.
- List of IO Objectives.

IO Concept of Support

The IO Concept of Support is developed during the planning process as a means to show how the commander visualizes the execution of information operations from its beginning to its termination. It describes how information operations will support the command’s mission.

An initial concept of support is drafted during Problem Framing along with the IO Estimate. It is refined during the COA process and developed in detail during the orders development. It may be different or modified by phase. Ultimately it will become a major element of Appendix 3.
(Information Operations) to Annex C. It will show how the IO effort will create an operational advantage and information superiority at the proper time and place.

The IO Concept of Support can consist of a narrative summarizing the IO Objectives or simply list the IO Objectives. It will list the IO tasks, purposes, methods, and effects needed to support maneuver and a time line and/or synchronization matrix on when these tasks will be executed. Depending on the OPT requirement it may also require a graphic display. It must show how IO will support maneuver and the accomplishment of the MAGT’s mission.

An OPT leader may include the initial IO Concept of Support as part of the graphic for each COA, as a separate section in a COA, or as a standalone brief. See Annex H of this handbook for examples.

Relationship between IO Objectives, Concept of Support, and IO Tasks
IO Tasks

The IO Concept of Support will include IO Tasks that identify specific actions that need to be taken in order to achieve the desired end state. Initial tasks are developed when the initial IO Concept of Support is developed. Tasks are then refined, added, deleted, discussed, and linked to a unit for execution during the COA process. They are flushed out during the orders development which must address how they will be executed and assessed. Remember an IO task requires ultimately someone or some unit in the MAGTF to conduct an action.

The best way to develop IO Tasks during Marine Corps planning efforts is to follow the model based on Essential Fire Support Task (EFST) which includes the task, purpose, methods, and effects. Each of these will be developed as they relate to IO not only in planning, but in targeting as well (see chapter 4 for more on IO and targeting). There may be multiple tasks needed for each IO Objective and to support maneuver, as shown in the IO Concept of Support. Their cumulative actions may be needed to achieve the desired result. As with the IO Objective, IO tasks must be developed in conjunction with the OPT so that they properly support the scheme of maneuver.

The “task and purpose” is what the commander wants his IO efforts to accomplish in order to support an action the MAGTF will conduct. It should be in line with an IO Objective. Initially developed during Problem Framing and refined during the COA process. It is linked to the Decide portion of D3A (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess) targeting process.

- Task: An action and target that are always target audience focused. Targeting objectives look at vulnerabilities that need to be exploited or preserved in the information environment.
  - An action can be either a lethal or non-lethal event.
  - A target may be physical (infrastructure, system, person, or persons), informational (content or flow of information), or cognitive (belief or perception of the target audience).
  - Target objectives – disrupt, delay, limit, destroy, divert, inform, influence, protect, etc.
- Purpose: Always friendly focused, provides the why and how the task contributes to the success of the MAGTF.
Methods – How the task and purpose will be achieved within the given limitations. Methods are developed during the COA process and refined during Orders development. They are linked to the Detect, Deliver, and Assess portion of D3A. There may be multiple methods developed as their cumulative effects may be needed to accomplish the task. Once all methods have been identified that will accomplish the task/purpose then lethal or non-lethal capabilities are placed against the methods and MOP/MOE can be developed.

Effect – The results of the methods needed to accomplish the task and provide the commander the end state he desires. It is linked to the Assess portion of the D3A. There should be a means of measuring the completion of the task either though BDA and/or MOE.

Measures of Effectiveness

MOE are described in more detail in Chapter 5 of this Handbook. When addressing the need for MOE, the IO Planner should seek guidance from the OPT leader or commander. MOEs require assets to be dedicated to collect data and analyze the effectiveness of an effort or task. The planning process may only build MOEs for essential tasks or may build them for each supporting task, such as the ones developed by the IO Planner. Situation, time, resources, and guidance will dictate the level of the MOE. Discussion on MOE development must done in conjunction with discussions on the development of IO Objectives and IO Tasks.

Provide Input to the Problem Framing Brief

One of the final steps in Problem Framing will be the staff presenting a Problem Framing Brief to the commander in order to review the completed products. The commander or OPT leader will designate how the brief will be conducted and what will be included. The IO Planner should anticipate providing input to the brief. It could involve a graphic version of the IO Staff Estimate, the CIO, or some other information. When approved by the commander, these products can be carried forward into the COA development.

Recommendations for IO Input into the Warning Order

Upon completion of Problem Framing, the commander may direct the release of a Warning Order (WARNORD) to allow subordinate commands to begin concurrent planning. The WARNORD should include any IO related information subordinate commands will need to conduct their planning. The IO Planner should make IO related recommendations on what IO aspects should be included in the WARNORD. The IO Planner should also be in
communications with the IO Planners of subordinate commands as early as possible during the planning process in order to ensure there is a good coordination of effort and that information in a WARNORD does not come as a surprise.

Steps 2-4: Course of Action Process

The second, third, and fourth steps in the MCPP involves COA development, war gaming, comparison, and decisions. As with Problem Framing, the OPT leader or commander will dictate the tempo of these steps and what is required by OPT members.

- Step 2 Course of Action Development: One or more options for how the mission and commander’s intent might be accomplished in accordance with the commander’s design.
- Step 3 Course of Action Wargaming: Examines and refines the option(s) in light of enemy capabilities and potential actions/reactions as well as other factors peculiar to the operational environment, such as the local population and how it may respond to friendly actions.
- Step 4 Course of Action Comparison and Decision: The commander evaluates each friendly course of action against established criteria, compares them against each other, and selects the course of action he believes will best accomplish the mission.

During the COA process the IO Planner can expect to:

- Assist in all phases of the COA process by providing IO Concept of Support for each COA developed.
- If the situation dictates, develop a different IO Concept of Support for each COA. Each one should be suitable, feasible, acceptable, and distinguishable. Depending on the COAs developed by the OPT the same IO Concept of Support may be used for all COAs. If this occurs the IO Planner will need to be able to justify the reasoning to the OPT leader or commander.
- Participate in the wargaming by providing input to the advantages and disadvantages for each COA as it applies to IO.
- Modify the IO Concept of Support based on the wargame, as well as updating IO related tasks, assumptions, shortfalls, etc, as appropriate.
- Work with the Intel Analyst to continually refine IO related Intel products.
- Have a well thought out IO Concept of Support by the end of step 4 that can be used for orders development.
• Continually refine the IO Estimate. At the end of the COA process have a completed estimate that can be used for orders development.
• Be prepared to provide IO planning support to any Branches the OPT is tasked to develop.

Step 5: Orders Development

The purpose of orders development is to translate the commander’s decision into oral, written, and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and promote initiative by subordinates. For the IO Planner that means:

• Continue to work with Intel on updating IO related Intel products.
• Develop Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C.
• Seek to have a summary (IO Objective) of the IO Concept of Support included as part of the base order or fragmentary order (FRAGO).
• Seek to have IO Tasks included under the tasking to subordinate elements in the base order, as appropriate.
• Participate in orders reconciliation and orders crosswalks, as directed by the G3/S3.

The time available, complexity of the operations, command involvement, and the direction of the OPT leader or commander will dictate the degree in which the IO Concept of Support is converted into a written annex. Orders, to include the portions involving IO can appear in a variety of forms, ranging from detailed, written documents with numerous annexes to simple verbal commands.

Execution of IO Tasks

A task requires someone or some unit in the MAGTF to execute an action. This action is executed through staff coordination, G3/S3 tasking to subordinate elements, or through the targeting process. Orders establish who does what.

Once the IO Tasks have been determined, the IO Planner will need to look at how each task will be executed. The IO Planner will determine the recommended method of execution, as well as the time, and location of the action. It is also recommended that the IO Planner look at the risk of inaction, in case the MAGTF cannot or will not execute the IO task. Once the IO Planner has this information for each IO task, and depending on the procedures of the MAGTF, the planner

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will have to take it to a targeting board, arrange for the G3/S3 to task subordinate units, or coordinate among the staff. Action involving the targeting board and the MAGTF’s targeting process is discussed in Chapter 4 of this Handbook.

- Staff coordination with capability owner on the MAGTF staff: IO Planner develops Task, Purpose, desired Effect, with the owner responsible for determining Method and helping to measure the Effect.
- Tasking to subordinate units: IO Planner develops Task and Purpose, and desired Effect with subordinate unit deciding on Method and helping to measure the Effect.
- Targeting process:
  - IO Planner develops Task, Purpose, Method, and Effect.
  - Capability should be a recommendation as the targeting process will make the final determination.
  - Additional key information would be location, time, MOE, risk of inaction, likely enemy reaction, and risk of failure.

If a MAGTF does not have a capability to address how a task will be achieved, then a request should be made to HHQ.
- Request HHQ execute an action to accomplish a Task/Purpose so a desired Effect is achieved at a given time and location.
- Request HHQ assign a capability to the MAGTF so that the action can be executed by the MAGTF.
- Until HHQ response to the request, the required capability is considered a shortfall

**Step 6: Transition**

Transition involves the briefs, drills or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution, subject to the variables of echelon of command, mission complexity and, most importantly, time. The IO Planner will need to concentrate on coordinating with the staff, higher headquarters, and subordinate elements to ensure the IO portions of the order will be properly executed and assessed. The planner must participate in all drills and confirmation briefs. The work with Intel on IO related Intel products does not stop with this step, but continues throughout the execution and assessment.

Regardless of how well an IO Concept of Support is written, it will be meaningless unless it is actually executed. Part of the process of developing an IO Concept of Support is considering
who will actually perform the tasking. Throughout the process the IO Planner should be communicating with both higher and subordinate IO Planners, as well as different staff elements in order to get their input and to socialize the plan. During the transition step, the IO Concept of Support should not come as a surprise to anyone who will be involved in its execution.

Outputs

At the end of the planning process, the IO Planner should have produced the outputs as shown in the below graphic.
Chapter 4

IO and the Targeting Process

Introduction

There are multiple ways to execute an IO Concept of Support. The IO Planner can coordinate directly with other staff sections that can control capabilities for the execution of tasks. The planner can work with the G3/S3 to ensure MAGTF orders include the appropriating tasking to subordinate units assigning responsibility for the execution of IO related tasks. Additionally the IO Planner can participate in the targeting boards and have tasks executed through their MAGTF’s targeting process. This chapter will focus on an IO Planner’s participation in the targeting process and what information should be brought into the process. There are several doctrinal publications on fires and targeting, but IO Planners can expect most MAGTFs to run the targeting process according to their own SOPs. The bottom line, going into the targeting process, the IO Planner must be fully prepared to justify tasks that must be executed in order to achieve success when executing an IO Concept of Support. These IO requirements will be in competition with other requirements by the staff and maneuver elements, and may be impacted by limited resources.

IO is not a warfighting function, but instead a synchronizing function which leverages all the warfighting functions in order to support maneuver warfare and other command requirements. There will be some who will only equate IO to Fires and an IO Planner may experience much of the planning and execution of IO through the lens of Fires. Targeting is part of the warfighting function of Fires. IO Planners closely integrate with Fires in order to nominate targets, deconflict redundant targeting, consider intelligence gains versus loss assessments, and provide inputs to the restricted and no-strike target lists.

IO Planners should not use the term “IO targeting” as this is not a proper term. Instead the discussion should be on using the targeting process to gain the effects the IO Planner believes is needed in order to accomplish the commander’s end state.
Lethal Versus Non-Lethal

Lethal and non-lethal are Marine Corps doctrinal terms, while the terms kinetic and non-kinetic are not. IO Planners may see both terms used and will confront a perception that IO is only non-lethal/non-kinetic. This may result in some commands limiting how they integrate IO into the targeting process, especially if they run separate lethal and non-lethal targeting boards. In fact targeting may involve either or both non-kinetic and kinetic actions, depending on the desired effect and understanding of the information environment. See the below table for examples of non-lethal and lethal actions that can be conducted on a target audience and that audience’s support structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted person</th>
<th>Non-Lethal Action</th>
<th>Lethal Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct engagement in order to influence decisions</td>
<td>Physically remove by kill or capture so decisions cannot be made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key advisor</td>
<td>Co-opt/influence key advisors who provide advice and counseling to the target</td>
<td>Kill or remove key advisors who provide advice and counseling to the target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information systems</td>
<td>Manipulate the information itself, the systems, or the processes needed to produce, process, receive, send, and store information that the target needs in order to make decisions</td>
<td>Degrade systems needed to produce, process, receive, send, and store information that the target needs in order to make decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human support organization</td>
<td>Influence/manipulate support organizations the target relies on for support, intelligence, and execution of his decisions</td>
<td>Attack those organizations the target relies on for support, intelligence, and execution of his decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Deny the use of infrastructure needed to house personnel or systems that support the target</td>
<td>Destroy infrastructure needed to house personnel or systems that support the target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of lethal and non-lethal actions that may affect Target Audience

Fires

Fires is defined as “the use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or non-lethal effects on a target.” (JP 1-02) Fires, in support of maneuver warfare, can be used to influence the decisions
of a target audience and to counter an adversary’s ability to leverage the information environment to achieve his goals.

According to Marine Corps Doctrine the Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC) serves as the MAGTF Commander’s principle staff section responsible for the overall planning and execution of fires throughout the MAGTF area of operations. By doctrine the FFCC consists of an officer in charge and three sections – plans, current fires, and targeting information. The FFCC will normally fall under the G3 though each MAGTF will organize it differently. Some MAGTFs may have the IO cell as subordinate to the FFCC. IO Planners may see MAGTFs use the word “effects” in naming any fires related organization, though currently this is non-doctrinal terminology for the Marine Corps. The IO Planner will be responsible for understanding how a MAGTF organizes and runs any fires related organization, regardless of how it is named, in order to properly integrate with it.

**Targeting Process**

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them. There are two targeting processes. The first has four steps methodology — decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) which is the doctrinal targeting process for the Army and the Marine Corps. The second is the joint targeting cycle which consists of six steps methodology — end state and commander’s objectives, target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, Commander’s decision and force assignment, mission planning and force execution, and assessment. While the two planning methods differ in terminology and number of steps, both address the same basic functions needed for targeting. Since MAGTF fires are usually a subset of the overall joint effort, IO Planners should understand how the two processes interact in order to leverage the joint process for external support.
The targeting process is linked to the Marine Corps Planning Process. As planning progresses, and target audiences are indentified, target packages will be developed for inclusion into the targeting process. This allows for a transition from planning to execution of an IO Concept of Support.

**Target Audiences in relationship to MCPP and D3A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify initial target audience</td>
<td>Identify potential key actors that can impact, either positively or negatively, the MAGTF’s end state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refine target audience</td>
<td>Based on time, space, available resources, accessibilities, intelligence requirements, and authorities, identify key actors who will be targeted. Identify requirements to Intel for analysis and collection. Identify methods to engage. Establish MOEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign methods to engage target audience</td>
<td>Identify who or what will engage the target, how the engagement will be done and assessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage target audience</td>
<td>Conduct action, either lethal or non-lethal, or a combination, against the target audience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess engagement of target audience</td>
<td>Determine success or failure and adjust accordingly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D3A Process

The D3A targeting process refers to the specifics of implementation—detailed planning (decide), execution (detect, deliver), and assessment—in pursuit of objectives established during conceptual and functional planning. Like any cyclical process, once underway it has no beginning or end. Each element operates interdependently, informing the others throughout the operation.

- **Decide:** This step looks at what needs to be targeted with fires, what objectives must be achieved to support the Commander’s intent or MAGTF operations, and the time and duration the target needs to be engaged. For planning this step is tied to Problem Framing and COA development where potential key actors that can impact, either positively or negatively, the MAGTF’s end state are identified. IO Planners should look to define the desired IO Objectives and begin to look at the required IO Tasks. It may be beneficial to organize the actors into target sets, begin a prioritization process, and begin the development of an assessment plan for each engagement.

- **Detect:** Detecting targets focuses on observing the operation to gather fires-related information as a basis for decision making. This involves the gathering of information about the operation primarily through feedback from collection platforms and higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting units. During this step IO Planners, working with their Intel representatives, will work to identify which key actors are potential target audiences and determine the ability of each target audience to influence the situation. They will also address the best means to engage the audience. Other areas to determine for an audience include vulnerabilities in the content and flow of its information, its susceptibility to psychological appeals, and its accessibility to key information conduits. This work will also support, and be part of, the IO Concept of Support.

- **Deliver:** This step involves the delivery of fires, whether lethal or non-lethal, onto the target. IO Planners will develop and coordinate actions based on the analysis of the target audiences and in accordance with the approved IO Concept of Support.

- **Assess:** The effect on the target is identified during this step based on a pre-established criteria for success through the use of MOPs and MOEs.
Targeting Boards

The MAGTF targeting board is the forum in which members present and discuss targeting objectives, desired effects, target priorities by category, recommended air apportionment, and other asset apportionments. The board also develops an integrated, prioritized target list of individual targets and recommended guidance for the Commander’s approval. Each MAGTF will establish how and when targeting boards are run. Depending on the situation it could run daily, weekly, or monthly. By Marine Corps Fires doctrine, an IO Planner is a member of the targeting board. Regardless of how the MAGTF conducts its targeting board the IO Planner must be fully prepared prior to participating in it. This includes coordinating through OPTs, working groups, face-to-face coordination with members of the staff and with Intel for the collection requirements. The key information the planner needs to have coming into a board includes the tasks (lethal or non-lethal action that will impact the target audience) and for each task:

- Purpose / how it contributes to the success of the MAGTF
- Recommended method on how the tasks should be executed (based on priorities, allocations, and restrictions)
- Once executed, the desired effect it will cause on the target audience
- Location of the action to be executed
- Time the action needs to be executed (should match with synchronization matrix found in the IO Concept of Support)
- MOE
- Risk of inaction if the task is not executed
- Risk of failure if the action fails to accomplish the effect
- Likely enemy reaction or recovery based on wargaming

The IO Planner should be prepared during the targeting board to brief the situation in the information environment and the status of information operations. The planner should also be prepared to show how, through prior coordination, IO nominated targets are integrated and deconflicted.

The results of a targeting board include air apportionment, MAGTF direct support targets, target nominations for higher headquarter sourcing, external target nominations, restricted targets,
limited targets, protected targets, recommended fire support control measures, and guidance for the next targeting cycles.

**Target Nominations**

During the course of planning the IO Planner will have an opportunity to nominate targets to be serviced through the MAGTF’s targeting process. This nomination of targets may begin during the Problem Framing process, and continues throughout the duration of an operation. IO Planners will need to start identifying possible targets that if engaged will support the IO Concept of Support. Target nominations may include entities or objects that when engaged will have an impact on the target audience. The target may be the actual person, persons, or groups identified initially as key actors, but have morphed in target audiences. Some of these audiences will evolve into high-value targets (HVTs) or high-payoff targets (HPTs). The initial target nomination will be refined during the COA development.

- By doctrine an HVT is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest.
- By doctrine an HPT is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly COA. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission.

An IO Planner may also see the non-doctrinal term “High Value Individual” (HVI) being used by the MAGTF. There is no approved definition for a HVI. If this term is used by the MAGTF it would be in the best interest of the IO Planner to push for a working definition of the term that all in the MAGTF understand and one that is approved by the commander. A HVI would have a description similar to a HVT. The only difference would be that an HVI refers specifically to a person, whereas an HVT could be a person, place, thing, etc.

Type of targets to consider should be those human, technological, and infrastructure elements within the physical dimension that supports the content and flow of information. The actual content of information and how it flows to and from the target audience can be targeted. Finally the target audience itself can be targeted for neutralization, deception, or protection.

When determining a target for nomination in the MAGTF targeting process, the IO Planner should consider these target validation questions at a minimum:
Does the target support the Commander’s objective and comply with the current guidance?
Does the target contribute to the adversary’s capability and will to wage war?
Is the target operational?
Is the target politically sensitive?
Is the target linked to an IO Objective or IO Task?
What psychological impact will it have on the adversary?
What are the rules of engagement considerations?
What is the impact of not conducting operations against the target?
How will assessment be conducted on the target?
Is engaging the target within the rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict?

It must be remembered that each MAGTF will have its own procedures which the IO Planner will have to abide by in order to be successfully engaged in the targeting process. Critical attributes include a target name/description, supported target objective, target significance, and the desired effect.

**Formats**

An IO Planner may be required to submit his target nomination along the same format as Fires. There are several methods that may be used. One method is to submit the nomination using the task, purpose, method, effect methodology.

- **Task:** Linked to the Decide portion of D3A, this lists the target objective, the formation, and the function. It is target audience focused.
- **Purpose:** Also linked to the Decide portion of D3A, this provides the why and how the task contributes to the success of the MAGTF. It is friendly focused.
- **Method:** Can be linked to the Detect, Deliver, and Assess portion of D3A. It addresses how the task and purpose will be achieved within the given limitations.
- **Effect:** Linked to the Assess portion of D3A. It looks at the means of measuring completion of the task.

Another method that may be used is to establish targeting objectives (ends), desired effects (ways), and an appropriate capability (means) to create the desired effects based on the mission, intent, commander’s guidance, and the specifics of the COA. To be effective, planners must be consistent in the application of these terms and not confuse them due to levels of effort and
resourcing implications. To accomplish the targeting objective, whether to disrupt, delay, degrade, or influence, planners determine the effects of fires, and the means or attack options.

Collateral Damage Consideration

Whether a target is serviced through lethal or non-lethal action there always exist the possibilities that there will be collateral damage. In a kinetic situation collateral damage is unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstance ruling at the time. Such injury or damage could have a negative effect on a target audience that does not support the IO Concept of Support. Even non-kinetic actions can create such negative collateral effects. Collateral effects should be considered additional effects that are cumulative and cascading.

Not all collateral effects, though, are bad. Some may cause results that support the desired effects the IO Concept of Support is trying to achieve. The IO Planner should carefully consider second and third order effects during planning and target nomination process to see the impact on the desired effect. This should be done not only on the targets the IO Planner is nominating, but on targets others in the staff are nominating as well.

- First order of effect: A direct targeting effect that is immediate and easily recognizable.
- Second and third order of effect: An indirect targeting effect that is usually delayed and may be difficult to measure.

If the IO Planner believes the collateral effect is unacceptable, then he needs to properly articulate the reasoning and brief it to the targeting board. If required, the IO Planner may seek to recommend the target be placed on a restricted list.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

IO Planners should be aware of Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) and how they may or may not impact efforts to influence a target audience. The FSCMs facilitate the rapid engagement of targets while protecting friendly forces. Planners apply FSCMs during COA development and refine them based on the results of COA wargaming. Doctrinally there are two types of FSCMs, permissive and restrictive.
Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of targets. There are five types of permissive measures—Fire support coordination line (FSCL), battlefield coordination line (BCL), coordinated fire line (CFL), free-fire area, and kill boxes.

Restrictive FSCMs safeguard friendly forces. A restrictive FSCM imposes certain coordination requirements prior to the engagement of those targets affected by the measure. Those requirements include a restrictive fire line (RFL), a restrictive fire area (RFA), and No-Fire Area (NFA).

The MATGTF may use other non-doctrinal restrictive measures as they apply to target audiences. The IO Planner needs to be aware of limitations that may be in place against a target audience when placed on a restricted list, or seek to have limitations imposed based on mission requirements.

Assessments

Combat assessments and measures of effectiveness (MOE) assess the effectiveness of force employment during an operation. Both are analytical processes that use reporting (intelligence and friendly unit information) to assess the effectiveness of an action, the protection of friendly systems and tactics, and the status of an target audience’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, effectiveness, and intentions. The difference between the two processes is the information used in each to make assessments. Combat assessment uses precise objective information, while MOE quantify subjective information. MOEs are discussed in Chapter 5 of this handbook.

Combat assessment has three components—battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and re-attack recommendation. Combat assessment is generally viewed as the legacy process for assessing lethal fires. It is a subset of the overall operational assessment of the command’s operations.

A BDA evaluates damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined target. Although BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, the process requires input and coordination from operations personnel. A BDA has three phases:

- Physical damage assessment: An estimate of the extent of physical damage based primarily on visual observation of the target.
• Functional damage assessment: Reviews all first-phase damage assessment and estimates the extent and duration of the effects of the fires. It also assesses the remaining functional or operational capability of the targeted facility or object, including estimates of the recuperation or replacement time required for the target to resume normal operations.

• Target system assessment: An estimate of the overall impact of force employment against an adversary target system.

Generally, BDA focuses on the results of attacks, both lethal and nonlethal, and too often is thought of only in terms of the number of casualties or the amount of equipment destroyed. Other forms of BDA could include the response or non-response of target audiences, changes in deception efforts or techniques, increases in communications efforts as the result of jamming, and whether the damage achieved is affecting the adversary’s ability to make informed decisions.

Though producing BDA is an intelligence responsibility, it requires coordination with operators conducting the attacks to be truly effective. Only then can BDA be timely enough to determine when an exploitable vulnerability is created or a threat capability is denied or defeated. BDA provides a series of timely snapshots of IO actions on the target audience which, when taken in sum, estimate the audiences combat effectiveness, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. This helps determine when or if the targeting is accomplishing its objectives.

The MEA occurs concurrently and interactively with BDA, since the same visual signatures used to determine the level of physical damage also give clues to the munitions’ effectiveness. The MEA is primarily an operational responsibility with input and coordination from the intelligence section. The purpose of the MEA is to identify, through trend analysis, any deficiencies in weapon systems, munitions performance, or combat tactics.

Re-attack recommendations answer the question, “What can be done to address shortfalls identified by the BDA and the MEA?” Recommendations can come in many forms, such as to re-attack the target with the same tactics and munitions, use a different weapon system and munitions, change procedures, or modify target system priorities.
Chapter 5

Measuring Success of an Information Operation

Introduction

Assessing IO is focused on planning a mechanism to evaluate command IO activities. The mechanism should allow a means to analyzing progress towards achieving the stated objectives or tasks. It allows for a means to develop recommendations in order to adjust actions if the operational advantage is not being reached. The assessment process uses Measures of Performance (MOP) to evaluate friendly force task performance at all levels of war and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to determine progress toward achieving objectives. IO MOP/MOE help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, are modifications necessary, or are new alternative actions required?”

The purpose of assessments is to assist the IO Planner in determining if the IO actions being conducted are having the desired effect on the Target Audience (TA). These assessments will ultimately support command decision-making during the conduct of an operation. Planners and operators analyze relevant information and intelligence received from all HHQ, adjacent and supporting commands, command operations and reports collected from unit operations to determine if progress is being made toward achievement of the command’s objectives. Results from conducting an assessment should provide the commander with recommendations on whether to continue as planned, modify tasks, develop new tasks or terminate the conduct of planned tasks. The assessment process should be able to detect changes in the information environment in a timely manner in order to provide commanders and staff sufficient time to make adjustments if necessary.

Assessments and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)

The assessments process commences during the Problem Framing phase of the MCPP when MOE requirements are identified. The development of MOEs begins as early as possible in MCPP and is refined throughout the process. MOP development occurs during the COA development phase once IO Objectives and IO Tasks have been identified. Early in planning,
operations and intelligence personnel must develop MOEs and tailor an intelligence collection plan that adequately assesses those MOEs. In order to focus and limit data collection requirements IO Planners and Intelligence analysts must work together to establish MOE in support of the assessment process, seeking to develop and apply intelligence efforts in the fields of signals, human and open source intelligence by primarily nesting into the command’s standard operations and intelligence reporting activities. Collection must be tailored to evaluate MOE in a timed and systematic process that

- Following execution, allows time for the target/target audience to internalize, decide, and take independent action.
- Permits observation, collection, and analysis.
- Will result in an assessment that can facilitate the commander’s operational decisions at identified and pre-determined decision points.

Key is to establish a base line of what evaluations will be compared to. This should be done as early as possible in the planning process in order to assess the success or failure of actions. Intelligence analysts help to assess task accomplishment by identifying the base line, then supporting MOE/ MOP development, collection, assessment, and re-attack recommendations.

**Responsibilities for Conducting Assessments**

The IO Planner needs to understand who in the MAGTF actually is responsible for conducting assessments. Depending on the size and resources of the MAGTF there may be individuals or teams assigned with the primary duty of conducting assessments. Other organizations may have it as an additional duty conducted primarily through an assessment working group. Both will look at assessing the overall effect of the MAGTF. The IO Planner should integrate the need for IO assessment into the existing MAGTF process. The IO Planner may also develop a mechanism for internally assessing IO actions. The ability to do this will be based on the size of the IO cell and resources available.
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

MOE assess changes in target behavior, capability or operational environment that are linked to the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance, but the cumulative effects of task performance. These MOE should be relevant, measurable, responsive and resourced in order to adequately assess the desired effects.

MOE are primarily a focused subjective analysis of observable actions in the battlespace used to determine effectiveness of actions being executed. MOE must be:

- Clearly defined, quantifiable, and observable.
- Tied directly to the cumulative effects of one or more tasks.
- Linked between friendly actions and resulting target observable behavior or actions.
- Support an operational decision point.

MOE should be reasonable and focused on mission essential objectives or tasks given the limitations of forces available, time lags for observables (indicators) to be collected upon, and time considerations for analysis of the data. Questions to be answered include:

- Are the actions having the desired effect toward supporting mission accomplishment and attaining the end state and objectives?
- Has an operational advantage been achieved?
- Do the tasks require modification, termination, or development of “new” tasks?

After identifying and clarifying the observable collection and reporting requirements the IO Planner must work in conjunction with the Intel analyst to plan for and allocate the forces required to collect the essential MOE data. It will be important to determine what is “essential” in order to use the time and resources available most effectively. This collaboration is done as early as possible during the planning process, but no later than COA development. Failure to articulate observables to the collecting force may result in no data or inaccurate and false data being collected. It is important to note that the collection of MOE data can take a considerable amount of time, so it is imperative to establish proper expectation management. For example,
objectives or tasks focused on changing the behavior of a specific target audience normally require 30+ days of multiple engagements via multiple methods or capabilities throughout several social levels in order to develop a perceived change in cultural (normal-cognitive) decision making indicated by changes in physical behaviors.

At what level MOEs should be built is based on the amount of time and collection resources available to the MAGTF. A large number of MOEs may look good on paper, but may be unrealistic to actually collect and analyze on. Depending on the MAGTF’s ability, an MOE may be tied to every action or a series of actions. It is recommend to try and have at least one MOE per IO Objective.

**Measures of Performance (MOP)**

MOP identify friendly actions that are executed to accomplish IO Tasks and mission objectives. MOP should also measure success in task execution and assess the requirement to repeat, modify, or terminate the task. MOP are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. Information Operations cannot generate desired effects if the planned tasks are not executed as planned or successfully executed. For example, a unit can deliver a message via well planned, respectful, culturally sensitive key leader engagement (KLE) events or simply throw handbills and leaflets at crowds. It is important not to interchange the meaning of a MOE and MOP. They are distinct separate requirements. MOP asks “did you perform the mission” while MOE asks “did you achieve the desired effect.”

**Criteria**

In order to be effective, MOP/MOE must meet the following criteria:

- **Relevant**: MOP and MOE should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, information environment, and end state, and support the commander at pre-determined decision points. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific information operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.
• Measurable: Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution.

• Responsive: The assessment process should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. The commander and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and identify indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the commander require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

• Resourced: To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored.

The following example illustrates MOE/MOP tied to an objective, effect and task

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective:</th>
<th>Deny enemy fighters safe haven in village “x”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO Objective:</td>
<td>Decrease Local National support to the enemy in village “x”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks:</td>
<td>Provide presence in village “x”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP:</td>
<td>• GCE conducts 45 joint night patrols with local army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• GCE conducts 38 joint daylight patrols with local police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• GCE, along with Civil Affairs (CA), Female Engagement Teams conduct multiple face to face KLEs with village leaders and businessmen in the village market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MISO Marines post 75 posters and hand out 300 leaflets warning local villagers of dangers in harboring enemy fighters and promoting Rewards/TIPs line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MISO Marines broadcast 5 messages exposing enemy criminal acts and warning local villagers of the dangers of harboring enemy fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CA completes projects: water pumps, police center, hospital, school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE:</td>
<td>• Increase in armed clashes between villagers and enemy fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Village elders demand enemy fighters leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased use of TIPs systems with actionable information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enemy fighters move to outlying areas surrounding village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased IED reporting from local village elders and villagers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment Data Input

Data to assist in assessments can come from a variety of sources, both qualitative and quantitative. The following table illustrates some examples of assessment data collections sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Intelligence</th>
<th>All source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Print, radio, internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling</td>
<td>State Dept, DOD, Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Reports</td>
<td>University Studies, Thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Reports</td>
<td>Industry, Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Reports</td>
<td>SITREPS, OPREPS, Atmospherics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Reports</td>
<td>Focus studies, Demographic reports, Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Reports</td>
<td>Cables, Financial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6

IO Cultural Integration

Introduction

In recent years, military services have observed increased demand for and emphasis on cultural considerations during mission planning and execution. This is partly due to the lessons learned during early operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the growing significance of non-kinetic effects on the battlefield. The complex nature of these operations has highlighted the need to learn and understand the operating environment in greater depth, in order to successfully engage with a Target Audience (TA), effectively deliver messages, and influence desired behavior.

It is important to note that the services have incorporated cultural considerations in their mission planning and execution for many years. The difference between now and then is the formalization of this process, to include training and education, and the development of models/tools for cultural analysis and integration during the planning process. For example, the recent version of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCWP 5-1) includes several culture-specific considerations during Problem Framing and throughout the Course of Action (COA) development steps.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight key cultural elements of the Information Environment that may impact IO integration within the planning process and targeting, and identify ways to leverage and integrate cultural knowledge in order to achieve IO desired effects across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO).

Defining Culture

Prior to discussing how culture relates to IO and how it is integrated, it is important for an IO Planner to understand what is meant by “Culture.” Culture has been defined in many ways and one definition that fits all is almost impossible to develop. In fact, culture is a process and a means for people to live their day-to-day lives. Social sciences such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology describe aspects of culture in various forms. Likewise, each service branch has taken a different approach in framing and defining culture for their particular operations. The approach and application to cultural analysis looks different depending on its purpose; however, the theory and research is synchronized across efforts. The goal is not to define culture around rigid tools, but rather to integrate the appropriate science to meet specific operational needs.

Despite the diverse descriptions of culture, the most common cultural characteristics across disciplines focus on the learned and shared patterns of daily life, to include:
It is important to keep in mind that these characteristics are complex, interconnected, and very fluid. Culture refers to a process and not concrete characteristics of an environment; it is often impacted by cross-cultural interactions and influences, making it dynamic and indefinable.

Why is this important for an IO Planner? Well, while it is important to gain cultural knowledge and integrate cultural considerations into planning, keep in mind that not everyone conforms to every pattern described as a “typical cultural behavior” and there are exceptions to the rules. In fact, often people describe cultures as “traditional”; however, all aspects of cultures change over time, even if it is very slow. More specifically, regional cultures are often divided into subcultures, and identifying some of the sub-elements is necessary in order to understand their formation and relevance in a given AO.

In addition, IO planners should understand the interrelationship between cultural variables in the specific AO in order to measure how a COA in one area might impact a change in another. However, these connections are highly complex, and it is impossible to identify and account for all the layers.

The Benefits of Cultural Knowledge and Integration During the Planning Process

Cultural knowledge is a necessary gear that guides the IO plan. As illustrated in Figure 1, a change in one gear causes a shift in the other. It is an additional tool kit and a form of intelligence that will help IO Planners effectively influence perceptions and behavior, deliver messages, and reduce the effect of an adversary’s information activities. Environments impact the planning process and execution, and the desired effects, in turn, impact the culture. This said, it is important to evaluate how your COA may ultimately affect cultural elements in the AO.

Having knowledge of the population and the environment can help an IO planner:
- Understand the nature of the problem in a given AO
- Identify the ideological and environmental causes of the behaviors
- Determine if the desired effects are culturally relevant
- Effectively manage perceptions by understanding the sources that are shaping them
- Avoid culturally inappropriate messages that could have detrimental effects in gaining the respect and support of the population
- Avoid unintended 2nd and 3rd order effects
- Avoid biased assumptions and stereotypes of the given population that may serve as a false guide to your planning process

**Culture Relevant for IO**

It is impossible to learn all there is to know about a given environment. Therefore, IO culture integration should focus on leveraging the socio-cultural elements of the operating environment that will inform IO Planners on how/what influences individual and group decision-making and behavior in order to shape the effectiveness of operational planning & execution, ultimately impacting the commander’s desired effects.

**Obtaining Cultural Information**

Several existing frameworks and processes guide IO Planners in gaining cultural knowledge of the operating environment. The following are few methods used to describe the cultural characteristics of an AO:

- One way an IO Planner can learn about a given culture is by analyzing the Information Environment (IE). The Socio-Cultural Integration Framework presented in Figure 2 highlights the cultural elements that are described under the Physical, Informational, and Cognitive dimensions of the Information Environment (IE). The framework depicts how IO planners can leverage this knowledge to enhance inputs into the planning process, determine the effects to achieve, and evaluate the 2nd and 3rd order impact of their plan.
Frameworks such as ASCOPE, PMESII, and DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) are also tools to scope the characteristics of a given environment. These methods can be applied to provide both general and in-depth information about an environment, depending on the type of queries requested by an IO planner and the resources used to gather the information.

Various publications also provide IO planners with guidelines for socio-cultural related questions. For example:

- The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s Cultural Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH) includes questions that would help planners assess the cultural behaviors and structures in a given environment.
- Annex C of this handbook lists in-depth questions that the IO planner and Intel Analyst should ask prior to their product development in support of the planning process.
- The book *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principals and Application*, published by the Marine Corps University Press, also includes basic questions in Appendix B, to help planners begin thinking about cultural factors that may impact their operational effectiveness.
An IO Planner should be cognoscente of the strengths and limitations of these frameworks and utilize a combination of these methods to draw the most relevant socio-cultural information to support IO requirements.

**Socio-cultural resources**

IO planners can gather socio-cultural information regarding a specific AO through various channels, depending on their location and access to resources:

- **Intel community** – Service and Agency level Intel centers can often provide socio-cultural data through collection teams, analysis, and products that support IO requirements. These resources are available either at a “reachback” capacity or on the ground support. As discussed in Chapter 2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)/Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) are means to integrate socio-cultural information during the planning process; however, the strength of these analyses depends on the relationship an IO Planner builds with the Intel Analyst. It is important for IO Planners to know how to frame their questions regarding an AO in order to leverage cultural information relevant to IO missions.

- **Cultural Centers** – Service and academic cultural centers and programs are available resources for IO Planners. These Centers often have culture-specific experts that could assist in solving a particular problem set. Some also list various culture related information and publications on their web pages. IO teams can also leverage these contacts for training and education purposes. Examples of these Centers include:
  - The Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)
  - The Army TRADOC Culture Center and the Army Human Terrain System
  - U.S. Air Force Culture and Language Center
  - Center for Language Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC)
  - Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
  - National Center for Language and Culture Research (NCLCR)
  - Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the U.S. State Department
  - Universities such as the Joint Special Operations University, Marine Corps University, American University, Georgetown University, George Washington University, Arizona State University, and University of California have established cultural and religion studies programs and departments that can provide useful resources to IO planners.

- **NGOs** – several Non-Governmental Organizations focus on cultural and regional issues and grievances. These organizations are often difficult to track; however, if present in the same AO, they can be a useful resource for IO planners to access.
Cultural experts – IO Planners should be cautious of the frequently used word “expert” to refer to individuals who have studied a given region and built expertise through scholarship and those who are native-born and serve as native cultural advisors. Also, academic cultural experts often study focused issues within a given environment and this knowledge should not be mistaken for broad range issues that can be present in a given AO. This said, it is important for IO Planners to converse with individuals who are assigned to units in support of operations to determine the person’s particular expertise and background.

- When leveraging cultural experts, IO planners should refer to a group of experts and not just one individual who might be assigned to a unit. These experts include but not limited to Cultural Advisors (CULADS), FAOs/RAOs, Social Scientists, and native advisors/speakers.

- Database resources – several of the above mentioned organizations also provide online database tools with socio-cultural data. University libraries can often be accessed for research publications and information on cross-cultural studies.

**Framing and Applying Operationally Relevant Cultural Knowledge**

Leveraging operationally relevant socio-cultural knowledge is essential to achieve an effective end state. This section will provide suggestions on how to effectively query and apply IO related socio-cultural considerations during the planning process.

It is necessary for the IO Planner to understand that cultural information should not be treated as a separate component during the planning process, but rather an integrated part of every stage, beginning from Problem Framing and through Transition. In addition to some of the above mentioned resources, here are examples of questions to consider during the MCPP:

**I - Problem Framing**

- How does the population identify itself?
- What are the narratives, worldviews, and perceptions that govern the individual/group decision making and behavior, and what/who is shaping them?
- What are the social structures, norms, traditions, values, and beliefs that guide daily life?
- What are the vulnerabilities, motivations, complaints, and grievances?
- What systems govern the lifestyles? What is the daily routine of the population?
- What is the basis for their attitudes and behaviors? Why?
- How do they communicate (style, language, outlets)?
- What influences the population’s decision making and behaviors?
- What do they feel most passionate toward? How do they express their emotions?
- What is sacred in the region? What carries significant meanings?
- How does the population solve problems?
- How does the population build relationships within the social structure? What are the laws, norms, mannerism, social roles, and etiquettes?
How are life concepts defined? (i.e. success, wealth, education, status)

What key elements of a given culture do you need to consider in order to achieve the desired effect?

Who are the actors that will help you establish alliances and collaborate with key personnel?

II & III- COA Development and War Game

How will your COA impact the population? Is your COA culturally appropriate?

How will the target audience and others who are connected to the TA perceive your action/message?

Are you delivering the right message to the right audience?

Will your COA trigger the desired emotions and behavior?

Who will gain and lose from your COA?

How will your COA interrupt the daily routine of the population?

Have you consulted the socio-cultural resources and experts to determine best COA?

Is your COA aligned with the population’s goals and expectations?

How will the population respond to your plan?

How might your plan impact the culture? How might cultural characteristics impact the effectiveness of the COA?

What are the 2nd and 3rd order effects (immediate and outside immediate area)?

IV - Comparison and Decision

Which COA will achieve the desired end state while causing the least amount of undesirable impact on the population?

Have you incorporated inputs and feedback from the cultural and academic experts?

Have you consulted your local and native experts?

V & VI – Orders Development and Transition

Have you listed limitations and outstanding issues based on cultural factors?

Are the cultural inputs and considerations captured during transition?

IO Effects often deal with changing, interrupting, and/or influencing behaviors of the TA. Since cognitive and emotional processes often influence human behavior, IO planners should identify the cultural aspects that drive these processes in order to determine culturally appropriate IO effects.
Chapter 7

IO and Information Related Capabilities

Introduction

IO is an integrating function, bringing multiple information related capabilities to bear in order to influence a target audience. It is the cumulative effects of these capabilities that the IO Planner seeks to leverage. The IO Planner does not own any capability, but needs to understand the basics of multiple capabilities that may be incorporated into an IO Concept of Support. In this way the IO Planner can plan and coordinate properly with the owners of the capabilities. There are certain core, supporting, and related capabilities that have been traditionally linked to IO. Too often though, IO has been equated to a specific capability which results in some commanders and planners believing IO is only Public Affairs (PA), or only Cyber, or only Military Information Support Operations (MISO), etc. Unfortunately, this has led many to get boxed in, and only focus on these capabilities. IO Planners will have to be careful that they, or their command, do not confuse the distinction between those capabilities and IO as an integrating function.

Doctrinal IO capabilities, such as MISO (formally known as Psychological Operations or PSYOP), Electronic Warfare (EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO) require trained specialists and equipment. More than likely, their training resulted in the awarding of a MOS or Additional MOS. Other doctrinal capabilities, such as Operations Security (OPSEC) and Military Deception (MILDEC), and non-doctrinal information related capabilities may be run by Marines with limited training who have been assigned to fill a need. Each MAGTF element must be able to incorporate and employ doctrinal capabilities, as well as exploit non-doctrinal capabilities to support the development of an operational advantage. Though others may be responsible for the detail planning of each capability, the IO Planner must have a solid understanding of those capabilities.

This chapter is designed to give IO Planners a brief overview of selected capabilities that can be integrated into IO Planning efforts. It is not intended to provide details on these capabilities or discuss all the capabilities that may be available. For such details, individual publications on those capabilities should be consulted.
Information Related Capabilities and Doctrine

Information related capabilities are elements used to intentionally and directly impact the content and flow of information. This is to alter or preserve the information environment and gain an operational advantage for a commander. JP 3-13 Information Operations (dated 13 February 2006) describes IO as a discrete set of capabilities that are doctrinally organized as “core, supporting, and related activities.” The distinction between them in reality may not be evident during the planning, execution, and assessment of an IO Concept of support.

- **Core:** Integrated into the planning and execution of operations in the information environment. Include MISO, OPSEC, MILDEC, EW, and CNO.
- **Supporting:** Have military purposes other than IO but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the information environment. Include Information assurance (IA), Physical security, Physical attack, Counterintelligence, and Combat Camera (COMCAM).
- **Related:** Have common interfaces with IO, but primary purposes and rules make them separate and distinct. Include PA, Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.

Capabilities associated with IO must not be restrained by this listing of core, supporting, and related activities. It must also include MAGTF elements whose purpose can be directly or indirectly related to, or have effects in, the information environment, and can conduct actions that support IO development of an operational advantage. The capabilities used to support an information operation should be selected based on mission requirements and the unit’s and/or element’s ability to impact the content and flow of information throughout the information environment. Marines should consider anything that is legal to influence an audience as an information related capability.

**Selecting Capabilities**

During the planning phase, once the task and purpose have been identified, the method will be discussed. The first part of this discussion should be on identifying what effects are required, and when, in order to execute the task. The second part occurs once the effects have been identified. At that point the planners should look at which information related capabilities can achieve the effects needed. A good IO planner should have the knowledge of other capabilities that may produce similar effects as a branch plan in case the most favorable capability is
unavailable. Some of these capabilities may be owned by the MAGTF, others may be owned by subordinate commands, and others owned by higher headquarters. The appropriate taskings or requests will need to be made, via the G3/S3, in order to ensure the capabilities are available at the time and location needed for the effect.

Many capabilities have regulations that limit their employment. This includes which headquarters controls the authorities for their use and how the capabilities may be used. IO Planners will need to have a thorough understanding of those regulations and authorities that govern the employment and use of any capability they wish to integrate into the IO Concept of Operations. If regulations and authorities restrict the use of a capability, then the IO Planner should seek other capabilities that may achieve the same effect.

Normally the IO Planners should not be expected to do the detail planning on the employment of any capability, although the circumstances may dictate otherwise. In some situations the planning effort for some capabilities may require the IO Planner to do the detailed planning, or assist in it. At a minimum, the IO Planner will need to articulate the desired effect, as well as the time and location, to the capability owner, who should do the detailed planning and execution.

There are some capabilities, such as OPSEC and MILDEC, where an IO Planner may be involved in the detailed planning or be assigned responsibility for that capability for the MAGTF commander. For example, the IO Planner may have the duty as the OPSEC Officer and when working the detailed planning for OPSEC, is an OPSEC planner not an IO Planner. This is because the integration of multiple information related capabilities is not involved. Circumstances may dictate that a Marine may have both duties, that of a capability owner/planner and of an IO Planner. It is important for the planner and the MAGTF leadership to understand the difference between a capability and IO which is an integrating function, and not to merge the two as one.

IO Planners should also consider the use of other enablers such as Special Technical Operations (STO), Alternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCMs), and Space in the course of their planning efforts.
Employing Capabilities

All IO related capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations, depending on the authorities that dictate their use. Depending on the MAGTF’s scheme of maneuver, they can be used in both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously to accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations and systems. Commanders can use IO related capabilities to accomplish the following:

- **Destroy**: To damage a system, or entity, so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
- **Disrupt**: To break or interrupt the flow of information.
- **Degrade**: To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and actions.
- **Deny**: To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services.
- **Deceive**: To cause a person to believe what is not true. MILDEC seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.
- **Exploit**: To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information.
- **Influence**: To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to US forces.
- **Protect**: To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information.
- **Detect**: To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.
- **Restore**: To bring information and information systems back to their original state.
- **Respond**: To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or intrusion.

Selected Information Related Capabilities

This chapter is designed to provide a discussion on IO and information related capabilities. Below are overviews of selected information related capabilities an IO Planner may integrate into planning efforts. This is not a complete list, nor does it infer that these capabilities MUST only be employed in an IO Concept of Support.
Military Deception (MILDEC)

Deception is an intentional action designed to gain an advantage. To gain that advantage may involve the use of disinformation (not to be confused with misinformation) which is false information intended to mislead. This false information could be the result of manipulation of the content and flow of information, as well certain forms of maneuver. This disinformation is intended to exploit a decision maker’s cognitive assumptions which are built on the information he receives. An adversary’s intelligence organization often provides the route in which to send disinformation, as all intelligence collection methodologies are subject to deception. When discussing deceptions, IO Planners must remember there is a difference between the joint definitions of deception and military deception.

- **Deception**: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 3-13.4)

- **Military deception (MILDEC)**: Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)

The focus of military deception is an adversary military decision maker. Terrorist groups, and adversaries with lethal intent, who are not part of a formal military organization, also fall under this category. This is where the MAGTF wants to do something to a target audience in order to gain an operational advantage. Collectively (MIDEC and other IO related capabilities) target adversary decision makers to affect their information systems and decision making process. This requires a thorough knowledge of adversaries and their decision-making processes. During the formulation of the commander’s concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the commander would like the decision maker to act at critical points in the battle. Military deception is focused on desired behavior, not simply misleading an adversary’s thinking. The intent is to cause the adversary commander to form specific inaccurate impressions, which will give the MAGTF commander an advantage.

Military deception planning and execution responsibilities belong to the Operations Officer. The actual duties will more than likely be assigned to an officer or SNCO either as an additional duty
or full time duty. It is not unusual for someone in the IO Cell to be assigned this duty or for the MAGTF to have OPTs or working groups that focus just on military deception planning.

There are certain terms and planning considerations associated with military deception that planners need to understand. Doctrinal publications will assist in this understanding. Regardless of the planning techniques used, or the methods to conduct the deception, these principles will apply:

- **Focus:** The focus is always the decision maker. Planners determine the effect they want from the decision maker and ensure it meets with the MAGTF commander’s intent.

- **Objective:** The objective is to cause the decision maker to take (or not take) specific actions at a designated time and place. Terms normally associated with this effort are:
  - Ambiguity-Increasing, this is used to delay or degrade a specific action the decision maker may take.
  - Ambiguity-Decreasing, this provides an illusion of reduced uncertainty and lower risk for the decision maker. In other words, the decision maker is very certain in what he believes, but in reality is very wrong.

- **Centralized Control:** Though control of a deception plan can be decentralized, the chances for success are greater if the plan is directed and controlled by a single element.

- **Security:** A deception plan is based on secrecy, if it is to be successful. Security measures must be very strict, with those involved in the planning kept to a minimum, need-to-know basis. Consider using the OPSEC process, to determine the best methods to protect the plan from improper exposure.

- **Timeliness:** Deception event schedules and execution matrixes must be carefully done. Priorities must be clearly set.

- **Integration:** Deception planning must be fully integrated and should occur simultaneously with operations planning. The plan will need to be coordinated with Higher Headquarters and adjacent units. In some situations the plan may have to be approved by Higher Headquarters. Other capabilities should be integrated in order to gain maximum effect.

**Operational Security (OPSEC)**

Operational Security, or OPSEC, is a process. It is designed to identify critical information to determine if friendly actions can be observed by adversary intelligence systems, to determine if
information obtained by adversaries could be interpreted to be useful to them, and then executes selected measures that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation of friendly critical information.

OPSEC is a methodology that denies critical information to an adversary. Too often security programs look at only the physical aspect of protecting information (such as safes, alarms, facilities), where OPSEC tends to look at the protection of the content and flow of information.

OPSEC responsibilities belong to the Operations Officer. The actual duties will more than likely be assigned to an officer or SNCO either as an additional duty or full time duty. It is not unusual for someone in the IO Cell to be assigned this duty. The duty will entail writing TAB C to APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX C of an operations order or plan, developing OPSEC policy for the MATFG, and working through the OPSEC process to identify indicators, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. OPSEC planning is based upon the five step OPSEC process.

Step 1 Identify Critical Information: The identification of critical information is important in that it focuses the remainder of the OPSEC process on protecting this critical information rather than attempting to protect all classified or sensitive unclassified information. Focusing on that information identified as critical saves time and conserves resources. Critical information are those specific facts about MAGTF intentions, capabilities, and activities, vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively against the MAGTF.

Step 2 Analysis of Threats: This step involves the research and analysis of intelligence, counterintelligence, and open source information to identify who the likely adversaries are in the planned operation. The OPSEC planner must work very closely with the Intel analyst during this step. Together they will seek to answer who is the adversary, what are his goals and strategy, what does he already know, and what are his intelligence collection capabilities.

Step 3 Analysis of Vulnerabilities: This step seeks to identify vulnerabilities in a MAGTF operation, or with the MAGTF itself. It requires examining each aspect of the planned operation to identify any OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information. It then considers if the adversary actually has an ability to collect that critical information. If the adversary has the ability to collect on an indicator, correctly analyze it, and then take timely action, then an OPSEC vulnerability exists. This step also involves very close coordination between the OPSEC manager and the Intel analyst.

- OPSEC indicators are those friendly actions and open source information that adversary intelligence systems can potentially detect or obtain and then interpret to drive friendly critical information.
OPSEC vulnerability is a condition in which friendly actions provide OPSEC indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decision making.

Step 4 Risk Assessment: Upon determining OPSEC vulnerabilities, the planner develops OPSEC measures to counter the vulnerabilities. An OPSEC measure is an action that can be taken to reduce the probability of the adversary being able to collect on an indicator, or being able to correctly analyze its meaning. More than one possible OPSEC measure may be developed for each OPSEC vulnerability. Since OPSEC measures may entail some cost in time, resources, personnel, or interference with normal operations, only specific ones may be employed. Which ones will be determined by the commander and his staff, based on a risk assessment. The most desirable OPSEC measures are those that combine the highest possible protection with the least effect on operational effectiveness.

Step 5 Application of Appropriate Measures: The command implements the OPSEC measures selected after the risk assessment. A program, or policy, will need to be established for the MAGTF in order to inform what measures will be employed, by whom, for how long, and why. A mechanism will need to be developed to monitor and report how the individual Marines and their units are actually executing the measures. During the execution of OPSEC measures, the adversary’s reaction to the measures must also be monitored in order to determine their effectiveness and to provide feedback to the MAGTF commander.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

Military Information Support Operations (MISO), formerly known as Psychological Operations (PSYOP), is a term used after a designated name change in 2010 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. IO Planners may see the term PSYOP used in old references, publications, in conversations with members of the military, in the press, by adversaries, key actors, and by allied forces or coalition partners. Regardless of the wording IO Planners should remember that MISO are “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.” Its purpose “is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.” (JP 1-02 Amended 15 May 2011).
MISO has the capability to accomplish multiple effects, but does have certain limitations that planners should take into consideration. Capabilities can include amplifying effects of operations, informing various audiences, targeting enemy morale, exploiting differences, supporting deception, and projecting images that are favorable to the MAGTF. Limitations can include the MISO product approval process, level of control by higher headquarters, rules of engagement, legal constraints, accessibility to the target, and developing means of assessing effectiveness of efforts on foreign audiences.

Foreign audiences include supportive, opposing, and neutral populace groups as well as adversarial forces, militias, networks, or criminal elements. MISO dissemination means can comprise a variety of methods to include, but not be limited to: physical engagements (face to face meetings, key leader engagements), radio, broadcast media, print, and use of social networks. MISO products are normally listed as “attributed” meaning the U.S. acknowledges the product, or “Delay Attribution” meaning the U.S. neither acknowledges nor denies ownership of the product. For “delay attribution” when the message or product is disseminated it is not attributed, but the combatant command must acknowledge its involvement as soon as operationally feasible, and within a reasonable period of time. This is after due consideration of operational and security requirements are determined.

Products may be pre-approved and already exist for the AO the MAGTF is operating in. While these pre-approved products may not fit the MAGTF situation exactly, they may be enough to impact the audience while waiting for new or modified products. New product development can be time consuming due to the intense scrutiny in the approval chain. The time required to be developed, get approved, produced and delivered to where the product can be disseminated should be a planning factor when it comes to considering the request for new products. What can be done and approved at the MAGTF level verse what must be developed and approved at higher echelons should be clearly understood by an IO Planner. Situations will be different depending on the theater the MAGTF is operating in.

To be successful, MISO must be carefully thought out. MISO generally targets specific groups of people – adversary units as whole, populations of villages, ethnic or tribal groups in a specified area, etc. Successful MISO hinges on the credibility of the message and messengers, and the ability of the audience to understand the message. Effective MISO is planned, truthful, and consistent. Decisions to have MISO deliver an untrue or deceptive message should be scrutinized, risk analyzed, assessed, and dedicated to even more detailed planning, coordination, and execution.
MISO should be viewed, and planned for, as a form of fires. Messages sent "downrange" can have detrimental effects similar to or worse than lethal actions. MISO forces need to be tasked with an effect that is desired allowing them to determine the most effective means to accomplish that objective.

MISO planning is done in conjunction with the planning process. IO Planners need to understand MISO planning activities and the PSYOP Objectives (PO) and Supporting PSYOP Objectives (SPO) MISO Planners will be working with. POs provide the framework around which the overall MISO program is built. A PO is a general statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral change of foreign audience. The purpose of a PO is to state the desired behavior changes in selected audiences that will best support the accomplishment of the supported commander’s mission. SPOs are the specific behavioral responses desired from the audience to accomplish a given PO. SPOs are unique for each PO, and each PO always has two or more SPOs. The terminology of PO and SPO are currently being used, despite the change from PSYOP to MISO. Some units have moved to MISO Objectives (MO) and Supporting MISO Objective (SMO). Until references are changed, planners may see either term used. The meaning remains the same.

An IO Planner, when working with a MISO Marines or Soldiers supporting their MAGTF should expect the following to be done by them:

- Development of Target Audience Analysis Worksheets (TAAW).
- Analysis of adversary propaganda using a SCAME (source, content, audience, media, and effects) report.
- Coordination for use of MISO products that will be used within the MAGTF AO, to include ordering, producing, and delivering the product to the point in the battlespace where it can be disseminated.
- The dissemination of MISO products to the target audience.

**Key Leader Engagements (KLE)**

A key leader engagement (KLE) is a method of building relationships with key actors in an area of operations. A KLE, which is done best through face-to-face meetings, fosters and expands communications and cooperation between the MAGTF and those that can support achievement of the MAGTF’s end state. More than likely, IO Planners will not conduct a KLE themselves.
(though it is always possible depending on the situation and mission). Instead IO Planners may be assigned the duty of determining who the MAGTF should engage or developing the packages that prepare those doing the actual engagement. A critical task will be ensuring the KLE is integrated with other actions that will achieve the end state.

There are numerous methods for organizing and conducting a KLE. Annex I provides some recommend techniques for preparing, executing, and assessing KLEs. One consideration is to align the process with the D3A process found in the target cycle.

Aligning KLE preparation, engagement, and assessment with the D3A methodology

Physical Attack

Physical actions on the ground, at sea, in the air, and in space, whether by maneuver or physical attack, can be used to impact the content and flow of information. Degrading, protecting, or preventing information flow through physical actions can control the type of information an adversary, neutral, or friendly audience receives. The results of physical attack can also influence the perceptions an audience has, which can impact the content of information.

Physical attacks can involve the use of destructive power to disrupt, damage, or destroy a system that an adversary needs to command and control, or influence others. Removal of the system degrades or prevents the adversary from receiving complete information or from sending key decisions to subordinates. In addition, it can be used to drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. Physical attacks can also be used to capture or kill key actors.
that decision makers rely on for advice and intelligence. Removing them as a source of information degrades or prevents the adversary from receiving information needed in order to make timely, accurate decisions. In a defensive role, physical attacks can be used against hostile elements in order to prevent them from disrupting, damaging, or destroying key information systems the MAGTF commander needs, or from harming key actors that the MAGTF is working with.

**Combat Camera (COMCAM)**

Combat camera (COMCAM) is the acquisition and utilization of skill sets to provide still photography, motion media, graphic design and reproduction in support of operational and planning requirements. The MAGTF will have COMCAM Marines assigned to them in order to support varying mission requirements to include, but not be limited to operations, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, assessments, MISO, PA, training, exercises, historical documentation, and legal actions. A major area COMCAM will support is IO; as such IO Planners will work directly with COMCAM Marines.

The IO Planner will need to understand who in the MAGTF the COMCAM Marines fall under, how they are tasked, and the procedures for reviewing and releasing images. As with other capabilities, planning for COMCAM use must be done as early as possible in the planning process. This includes determining the requirements of higher headquarters for images, to include time sensitive subjects, and how that may impact the MAGTF’s needs.

When it comes to the MAGTF’s needs, planning guidance must include the types of images required, why, and when needed. As part of this discussion the IO Planner needs to understand any limitations a COMCAM Marine may have on being able to transmit images back in a timely manner. Limitations may be based on equipment used, location of the COMCOM Marine in the battle space, and communication system limitations for file sizes.

The IO Planner will include other capability owners in discussions on what the images will be used for. There may be several entities in the MAGTF with imaging needs. How these needs fit into the overall effort to satisfy an IO Objective, and help achieve an effect is an integration challenge an IO Planner must work.
Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

The term Civil-Military Operations (CMO) describes all of the activities that the commander undertakes between civilians and the MAGTF in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission. Effective CMO minimizes civilian interference with and maximizes support for the mission. There is a CMO component to each and every military operation, though the MAGTF resources devoted to CMO will vary with particular operations and even throughout the phases of operations.

Civil Affairs (CA) is a term that is used only to describe designated personnel and distinct units. CA forces are organized and equipped specifically to support CMO and to conduct so-called "CA Activities." These CA activities are those which embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, and which involve the application of particular skills normally the responsibility of civil government. CA is neither a mission nor an objective, but the name of a particular force that supports the commander's need to exercise command and control over the MAGTF.

It is common to believe that CMO is a responsibility assigned solely to dedicated Civil Affairs forces, or even that the two terms are interchangeable. Instead, every element of the MAGTF may participate in the planning and execution of CMO, and CA forces bring expertise to each and every MAGTF operation. By themselves, neither CMO nor CA are missions or objectives.

The IO Planner will work with those involved in CMO in order to ensure their efforts are properly integrated into the overall IO Concept of Support. Those involved may be Marines, members of other services, or members of Other Government Agencies (OGAs). The planner must ensure the integration is synchronized with the CMO policy which will be established outside of the MAGTF. Joint Force Commanders will establish policies for CMO, and MAGTF CMO must be responsive to their guidance.

Electronic Warfare (EW)

The purpose of Electronic Warfare (EW) is to deny an adversary an advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) in order to ensure friendly unimpeded access to the EMS portion of the information environment. The use of the EMS by adversaries creates vulnerabilities and opportunities for EW in support of military operations. EW can be applied from air, sea, land, and space by manned and unmanned systems. EW is employed to support
military operations involving various levels of detection, denial, deception, disruption, degradation, protection, and destruction. The force that can deprive an adversary’s use of the EMS, exploit an adversary’s use of the EMS to obtain information for its own purposes, and control the EMS will have an important advantage.

EW plays a major role in attacking and exploiting the adversary’s ability to use information, while defending our ability to process information. It consists of three major subdivisions:

- **Electronic attack (EA):** Involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. It is considered a form of fires.
- **Electronic protection (EP):** Involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.
- **Electronic warfare support (ES):** Is the subdivision of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations.

EW can directly affect the informational environment in a myriad of ways, either through direct attack of an adversary and his use of the EMS, or through protection of friendly usage of the EMS. Due to the congested/contested nature of the EMS, in depth planning is required. Availability can be problematic as virtually all organic and inorganic EW platforms are considered national assets, and judicious use of these High Demand Low Density items is a planning factor. Normally school trained EW personnel will plan and coordinate EW for the MAGTF. Depending on its size and mission a MAGTF may have a dedicated EW cell, staffed by EW specialists. IO Planners will need to coordinate with these specialists in order to effectively integrate EW into any IO Concept of Support. In order to do this, the IO Planner should be familiar with the process of requesting EW support, understanding the request forms involved, who is responsible for the tasking, and how EW nominations are handled, but ultimately the IO planner needs to know what effect to ask for. Airborne EW target nominations are requested through the MAGTF EWO, who will submit the Joint Tactical Air Support Request (JTASR) and Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF) to the appropriate theater level Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (EWCC) for prioritization and deconfliction prior to the Air Operations Center for tasking via the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Preplanned requests must
take into account the ATO cycle. Ground-based EW is conducted by Radio Battalion. Radio Battalion is tasked by the MAGTF G-3. Requests for ground-based EW must be coordinated with the MAGTF G-2. All radio frequencies must be de-conflicted through the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). EW Planners must adhere by theater-specific Rules of Engagement and EW Special Instructions (SPINS).

Public Affairs (PA)

Public Affairs (PA) is how the MAGTF communicates its official and unclassified activities to interested audiences, particularly through the news reporting community. Media engagements, including day-to-day communications, interviews, embedded reporters, and press releases can have immediate tactical and operational effects with strategic implications. PA events should be coordinated to support the commander’s campaign plan, intent, and current operational themes. PA integrated into an IO plan can provide timely-factual-early release of information through a wide dissemination plan that may include print, audio, and visual media conduits to the international, regional, and local media.

Regardless of where the MAGTF is deployed, there will be media involvement. In some cases members of the media may even be in the battle space prior to the arrival of the MAGTF. In many cases media will be embedded with the MAGTF. They bring with them the ability to report on events to both local and global audiences. This ability can greatly impact target audiences and affect the content and flow of information throughout the information environment. The speed of actions, and reactions, to events must be a planning consideration. The IO Planner will need to understand the role of PA and work with the Public Affair Officer (PAO) in order to understand the realities the media brings to the battle space and how they can influence public perceptions. This impact on perceptions, which is sometimes referred to as the “CNN factor,” can influence the guidance the MAGTF commander receives, as well as impact the objectives and end state he
desires to achieve. As a result it can have a direct impact on the execution of an IO Concept of Support.

The MAGTF PAO has the duty of communicating truthful and factual unclassified information about MAGTF activities to US, local, allied, national, international, and internal audiences. The PAO also provides advice on media events and operations, and helps with the development and dissemination of the command information message. PA helps with information security (INFOSEC) and OPSEC by establishing ground rules for media coverage of military operations. PA plans and assists MAGTF support to the media in conjunction with military operations, and assists the media by helping them understand MAGTF events and operations.

The primary roles of the PAO are to facilitate the release of timely, accurate information to the public and oversee internal information and community relations programs. When directed by the commander, the PAO is also the chief command spokesperson. A key function of the PAO is educating internal and external audiences.

The PAO can assist in the countering of an adversary’s propaganda by leveraging the MAGTF’s creditability factor. It is often said that in today’s media environment gaining and maintaining the information initiative in a conflict can help discredit and undermine adversary propaganda. The first side that presents the information sets the context and frames the public debate. MAGTF release of information may never beat the adversary’s almost immediate access to regional and international media for propaganda affect; however, a timely PA press release, highlighting known facts, reinforced with COMCAM and other still and motion imagery, can lead and shape the public discussion in relation to significant MAGTF events.

Information Operations Officers should be familiar with the various homepages, newspapers, and other public information sources of the units involved in missions, as well as the PA guidance that the PAO is operating under. Key is providing PA personnel with timely and factual information for use in early and follow up press releases.

**Computer Network Operations/Special Technical Operations (CNO/STO)**

Computer Network Operations (CNO) (Increasingly referred to as Cyber Operations) is comprised of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Defense (CND). CNA deceives, degrades, or disrupts automated information systems (AIS). CND monitors, analyzes, detects and responds to threats to the AIS. CNE
enables operations and intelligence collection (JP 3-13). CNO by itself is not IO; however when the effects are coordinated with larger operations or actions are taken through Cyberspace to influence a target, the operations fall squarely within the scope of IO. Though the Marine Corps operates in many underdeveloped countries that a casual observer would perceive as irrelevant for CNO, the reality is that increasingly, even in underdeveloped countries, computers underlie the rudimentary infrastructure that does exist: power generation, communications, supply, etc.. The key to successful CNO is foremost the authorities, who is authorized to conduct an operation and what they are allowed to do. These authorities are coordinated through the Combatant Command and must be planned for and requested early in the planning stages of an operation. The second factor is the means. Organic means may be available, however if the means are non-organic, the lead organization must outline the desired effect and the timeframe and facilitate the request through operations channels to facilitate tool development.

Key cyber terms an IO Planner should understand include:

- Computer network operations (CNO): Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations.
- Computer network attack (CNA): Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.
- Computer network exploitation (CNE): Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.
- Computer network defense (CND): Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks.

Special Technical Operations operates under a similar construct to CNO but is typically more accessible to a MAGTF as each MARFOR and each MEF has a STO Chief. While STO is not one of the typically associated Core, Supported, or Related capabilities of IO it can be a capability that a planner includes in their course of action but must be planned for early and with the correct accesses if it is to be effectively integrated, similar to CNO.

For both CNO and STO the critical factor is authorities. The IO Planner must understand what authorities are available and how to request additional authorities or capabilities through the processes that govern CNO and STO. The planner must also understand the timelines to grant...
authorities and capabilities vary widely depending on the priority and visibility of an operation. Prior preparation is the best way to ensure the availability of assets.

The IO Planner may run into several issues when trying to leverage CNO or STO. The first is a clearance issue. Typically each capability requires a Top Secret clearance and to be read into certain programs. Another issue is authorized facilities where the planning must take place in. Depending on the MAGTF the IO Planner is assigned, that MAGTF may not have the facilities or the proper clearance. If the planner does not have access, then he/she needs to determine who does have the ability to leverage CNO or STO and articulate the effects that are required. The CNO or STO planners will work the details and give guidance if the effect is doable based on their assets/abilities. The IO Planner will need to determine the proper channels to make requests.

Money

In some environments MAGTF’s may find the need to employ money as a weapons system in order to influence key actors of the local population and defeat any adversary. Money is one of the primary weapons used by US Forces to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations. Types of funds possibly available include, but not limited to, Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), DoD Rewards Program, Field Ordering Funds, and Official Representation Funds (ORF). There may also be funds from other US Agencies available for use. Unfortunately, funding sources, amounts, and guidelines vary by area of operations. What applies in one area is not necessarily true in other areas. Additionally, written guidelines, policies, and procedures constantly change. The best funding information source is the supporting resource manager who provides both the funds and guidance for use of the funds.

An IO Officer may find money a key element in achieving success of the IO Concept of Support. Before doing so it is imperative to understand who controls and accounts for funds, who may issue or release funds, guidelines for fund use, legal issues, amounts that are allowed, and the time required in order to make a payment. IO Planners should meet with their supporting resource manager to become aware of all funding sources available to maximize their use to help support the IO Concept of Support.

IO Planners may be responsible for funding resources as part of executing the IO Concept of Support. More than likely the IO Planner will work with others who control funding sources
and make requests to the funding manager for expenditure of funds. The IO Planner must know and follow the procedures that are established and maintain records of use and results. Anytime money is leveraged there is a possibility of fraud, waste, and abuse of funds, which resource managements’ expertise and knowledge of funding programs and contracting can help prevent. Regardless of who actually controls the funding, the first step is to look at what effect the use of money will achieve. IO Planners should also consider the pitfalls leveraging money may cause among the different audiences being targeted.

Key terms an IO Planner should understand include:

- Commitment is an administrative reservation of funds for a specific procurement of goods or services subject to funds availability.
- Obligation is a legal reservation of funds for a specific procurement of goods or services based on, for example, a contract for goods or services. Funds are formally obligated when the government has a legal requirement to pay, such as when the vendor and the authorized government official sign an agreement.
- Disbursement of funds from an authorized USG disbursing agency is made once the agency receives the invoice and the contract and the requestor verifies receipt of the requested goods or services.
- An unfinanced requirement (UFR) is a valid requirement with no available funding source. A UFR may occur when funds are inadequate to support requirements or during budget execution as new requirements surface. UFRs rely on additional funds from higher headquarters or from savings generated during the execution of the budget.
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Annex A

Glossary

This glossary contains a selection of terms that may be associated with IO. It is not meant to be an exhaustive listing as other terms, both doctrinal and non-doctrinal, may apply. Terms used in the planning, execution, and assessment of any operation, not just IO, should be understood by all involved. Prior to using any doctrinal term ensure the latest approved definition is understood and agreed to by all in the process. For non-doctrinal terms ensure the definition being used is approved by the MAGTF leadership and understood by all involved.

**Attack** - (MCRP 5-12C) An offensive action characterized by movement supported by fire with the objective of defeating or destroying the enemy.

**Civil Military Operations** - (JP 1-02) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.

**Combat Camera** - (JP 1-02) The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during joint exercises. Also called COMCAM.

**Computer Network Operations** - (JP 1-02) Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. Also called CNO.
Coordination - (MCRP 5-12C) The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary.

Core IO Capabilities – (JP 3-13 dated 13 February 2006) IO core capabilities are Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO) which are to be integrated into the planning and execution of operations in the information environment. They work in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities.

Corrupt - (Webster) - Made inferior by errors or alterations.

Counter-Intelligence - (JP 3-13) Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

Cyberspace- (CJCS CM-0363-08) A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

Cyberspace operations- (JP 3-0) The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid.

Deception - (JP 3-13.4) Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests. Also see military deception.

Defend - (Websters) To ward off attack from; guard against assault or injury.
Degrade - (JP 3-13) To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and actions.

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy - (JP 3-13) Activities and measures taken by DOD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG.

Deny - (MCRP 5-12C) To hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities.

Destroyed - (JP 1-02) A condition of a target so damaged that it can neither function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition. In the case of a building, all vertical supports and spanning members are damaged to such an extent that nothing is salvageable. In the case of bridges, all spans must have dropped and all piers must require replacement.

Disinformation - (FM 100-6 Information Operations dated 27 August 1996) Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence US decision makers, US forces, coalition allies, key actors or individuals via indirect or unconventional means. (Webster) False information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.

Disrupt - (JP 3-13) To break or interrupt the flow of information.

Detect - (JP 3-13) To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.

Effect - (JP 1-02) 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.

Electromagnetic Warfare - (JP 1-02) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called EW.
**Exploit** - (JP 3-13) To gain access to adversary command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information.

**Fires** - (JP 1-02) The use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target.

**Influence** - (JP 3-13) To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to US forces.

**Inform** - (Webster) To give or impart knowledge of a fact or circumstance.

**Information Assurance** - (JP 3-13) Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA.

**Information Environment** – (JP 3-13) The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

**Information Operations** – There are three definitions on IO that planners should be aware of. One is found in the JP 3-13 (dated 13 February 2006) which though outdated may still exist in many different publications. This definition was superseded in Secretary of Defense Memo date 25 January 2011 which is the current approved definition. There is also a proposed USMC IO definition. The DoD definition is joint, almost at the strategic or operational level. The Marine Corps’ is Marine specific and meant for the operational or tactical level.

DOD (JP 3-16 dated 13 February 2006): The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military information support operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

DOD: (SecDef Memo 12401-10 and JP 1-02): The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.
USMC: (Based on draft version of MCWP 3-40.4): The integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a target audience’s behavior in order to create an operational advantage for the commander.

**Information Superiority** - (JP 3-13) The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.

**Information Operations Intelligence Integration** – (extracted from NGIS presentation) – A critical catalyst for collaboration among a full range of intelligence and analytic disciplines which develops specific desired products, integrates distinct and diverse inputs, and employs quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques in order to facilitate successful Information Operations. Also called IOII.

**Integration** - (JP 1-02) The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.

**Key Actors** – Term is found in MCWP 5-1 MCPP under the problem framing discussions of understanding the environment. The MCWP 5-1 does not provide a definition. The Marine Corps IO Center defines key actors as an individual, individuals, or groups that can either positively or negatively impact a MAGTF’s end state. Identified early in the planning process, key actors, depending on their ability to influence, available time, and MAGTF resources, can become target audiences.

**Measure of Effectiveness** - (JP 1-02) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE.

**Military Deception** – (JP 3-13.4) Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC.

**Misinformation** - (FM 100-6 Information Operations dated 27 August 1996) Unintentionally incorrect information emanating from virtually anyone, for reasons unknown or to solicit a
response or interest that is not political or military in origin. (Webster) Untrue or incorrect information.

**Military Information Support Operations** – (JP 1-02) Formerly PSYOP. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called MISO.

**Neutralize** - (JP 1-02) 1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent.

**Objective** – (JP 1-02) 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). See also target.

**Operations Security** - (JP 1-02) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC.

**Physical Attack** - (JP 3-13) Disrupts, damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive power.

**Physical Security** - (JP 3-13) That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

**Protect** - (JP 3-13) All actions taken to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information.
Public Affairs - (JP 3-13) Public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences with interest in DOD.

Reachback - (JP 1-02) The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed.

Related IO Capabilities – (JP 3-13 dated 13 February 2006) IO related capabilities include public affairs (PA), civil-military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy which have common interfaces with IO, but primary purposes and rules make them separate and distinct.

Response - (JP 3-13) To react quickly to an adversary’s information operations attack or intrusion.

Restoration - (JP 3-13) To bring information systems back to their original state.

Strategic Communication - (JP 5-0) Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. Also called SC.

Supporting IO Capabilities – (JP 3-13 dated 13 February 2006) IO supporting capabilities include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and Combat Camera (COMCAM) which have military purposes other than IO, but either operate in the information environment or have an impact on the information environment.

Synchronization - (JP 1-02) 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support.

Target – (JP 1-02) 1. An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst that hits the target.
Target Audience – (JP 1-02) An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA.

Weaponneering – (JP 3-60) The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapons characteristics and effects, and delivery parameters.
Annex B

Questions to Prevent Mirror Imaging

Before identifying key actors within the society/community to engage

Ask: Who are these people?
• How do they identify themselves?
• What are their social norms?
• What are their common values?
• How do they perceive who we are and what we are trying to do?

Ask: What will our actions do?
• Do our planned actions place aspects of local identity, specific social institutions, or widely held values under threat?
• Do we understand the scope and depth of likely societal reactions when we attempt change?
• Can we identify/highlight which groups are going to be disenfranchised by our move?
• What contingency plan should we develop for those disenfranchised in order to avoid the sort of alienation that pushes them into the camp of the adversary?

Throughout the process, but especially prior to the execution of the plan and when assessing the success of a plan:

Ask: Have we allowed our identity, cultural norms and values to dictate how we think the target audience should react?

Ask: Have we created vulnerabilities by creating a time line or setting a deadline based on our concept of time?
• Do we understand their concept of time as compared to ours?

Ask: Are we relying on our social customs, norms, etc, to "sell" the product?
• If yes, will these techniques hamper the audience's ability to understand and/or interpret the message?
Ask: How will the audience interpret the words and images we will use to "sell" our product based on their belief system?
  • Is that different than what we intended?

Ask: How will the audience define success, and is it different than our own?

Ask: Do we know their definition of honor, and will that definition impact what we are trying to do?

**Prior to engagements**

Ask: Can we articulate, in 5 minutes or less, a message that offers hope in a way that will be understood by an audience?*

Ask: Is there a historical event or person, local folklore, and/or traditional form of entertainment (like poetry reading) that means something to the audience that can be used to "sell" what we want?
  • Can we find past examples in the target audience's own history of the principles we are hoping to see employed today?
  • Is our message being framed in such a way that it connects to traditional identities rather than emphasizes "becoming like us"?

*"we" in this case mean the IO planner's Commanding Officer, or others in the chain of command doing key leader engagements.
Annex C

IO Related Intel Questions

These questions should be answered when building different IO related Intel products. These are meant as a guide only and the IO Planner and Intel Analyst should not be confined to just these questions. IO has three dimensions:

- **Physical Dimension**: Key individuals and human networks, along with technical and physical infrastructure that supports the information flow to an audience.
- **Informational Dimension**: Content of information that has an influencing effect and the way it flows to an audience.
- **Cognitive Dimension**: The beliefs of a person or persons whose decisions can impact the Commander’s End State.

**Key questions when assessing a TARGET AUDIENCE.**

**Physical Dimension:**

- **Who are the people the TA associates with?**
  - **Key individuals that have a close relationship with the TA and provide advice and counseling:**
    - Who are the key advisors (family, business, religious, organization)?
    - What are the primary beliefs of these advisors (attitude towards the US)?
    - Who is the TA’s spokesman?
  - **Human networks the TA uses for support:**
    - What organizations or groups does the TA associate with (political, business, criminal, media, religious, tribal) and how close is he to them?
    - What are the goals of these groups?
    - Does he have a media cell?
- **What equipment and facilities does the TA have?**
  - **Technical infrastructure needed to produce, process, receive, send, and store information so the TA can interact with others and make decisions:**
    - What technical resources does the TA have access to?
    - What media does he have access to, control, or own?
    - What means does he use to communicate with others (email, social network tools, phones, courier, radio)?
Physical infrastructure that houses the TA’s technical infrastructure and those associated with the TA:
- Where are the media facilities that the TA uses?
- What religious facilities does the TA use?
- Where does the TA socialize?
- What front companies does the TA utilize?
- Where is the TA’s residence and place he conducts business?

- Can the TA actually send and receive information?
  - Does the environment support the actual ability to send and receive information?
  - What or who is most capable?

Informational Dimension:

- What is the content of the information? Content of the message that the TA thinks will influence others to help meet his goals.
  - Who is the message intended for?
  - Why was the message or image sent? Is the TA pushing out his ideology or responding to someone or some event?
  - What does the message say, and what are its key points or themes?
  - How does the themes in the message compare to themes in past messages? Does it represent anything new?
  - What do the images show?
  - Is the TA emphasizing any particular part of his ideology, more than other parts?

- How is the information sent? How the message flows so its intended audience will hear and/or see it.
  - Who is actually sending the message?
  - How is the message being passed – method (how), tempo (speed), language, format (style)?
  - What format is the message in (written, verbal, image)?
  - Is the message or image clear, and will it be easily understood by the intended audience?
  - How is the quality of the product?
  - Is the message being picked up and passed by others?
  - Is the intended audience receiving it?
  - Are unintended audiences receiving it? How are they reacting to it, and what impact is it having on them?

- Is there any competing information?
Cognitive Dimension:

- What influences the TA? Decisions based on culture, life experiences, relationships, outside events, ideology, and the influences of those inside and outside the TA’s group.
  - What are the TA’s life experiences?
  - What historical events impact the TA’s thinking?
  - What current events or issues will most likely have an impact on the TA?
  - Who inside the TA’s group is trying to influence him, what are they telling him, and why?
  - Who outside the TA’s group is trying to influence him, what are they telling him, and why?
- Who does the TA collect on? Build perceptions based on the information collected, either overtly or covertly on beliefs, perceptions, or plans of others.
  - What groups is the TA most interested in?
  - What has the TA learned about those groups?
  - What perceptions could the TA develop based on what he may have learned?
- Who does the TA influence? Decide how to react, and who and how to engage and influence in order to meet goals.
  - What has the TA most likely decided to do?
  - Who has the TA decided to engage and influence and why?
  - What is the TA’s end state?

Key questions for the CIO

Physical Dimension:

- What are the basic demographics of the AO?
  - Size of the population.
  - Location/density of the population.
  - Percentage of rural versus urban. Primary areas for each.
  - Age and sex statics.
  - Number above and below the poverty level.
Literacy and education level.
- Primary livelihoods.
- Cultural highlights of groups.
- Type of government that governs the population.
- The level of government, religious, or other restrictions the population lives under.

- Who are the main groups that have the most influence?
  - Consider tribal, business, government, military, militia, religious, political, criminal, etc.
  - Include who these groups are, where they are located, and what type of infrastructure they own or control (media, mosques, businesses, etc).
  - Identify who the primary leaders of these groups are to include who their key lieutenants are and where these leaders are based out of.
  - Identify what other groups ally themselves with these groups.
  - Who or what outside of the groups has an influence over the group?
  - Consider the NGOs or international groups operating in the country and what their role may be with the main groups and general population.

- What is the radio, TV, print, and internet infrastructure?
  - Who owns the media?
  - How their news is slanted.
  - Penetration into the population.
  - Who the main groups favor and trust.
  - Location of the media.
  - The medium radio and TV use – antenna or satellite.

- What is the telecom infrastructure?
  - Who owns the telecom?
  - Penetration into the population.
  - What is the most popular?
  - Location of the supporting infrastructure.

- Where/what are the major communication hubs.
  - Consider mosques, markets, gas stations, schools, etc.

- For the government, HN military, militias, insurgents groups, and perhaps political groups, what does their C2 structure consist of, and where are the major components of that structure located?

- How sophisticated is the environment?
  - Does the environment support the actual ability to send and receive information?
  - What or who is most capable?
Informational Dimension:

- What are the dominant narratives in the AO?
  - Consider narratives that impact all groups as well as narratives that are stressed by the main groups.
- What are the other, competing narratives in the AO?
- How are the narratives being passed?
  - Consider method (how), tempo (speed), language, format (style) and the format of the narrative (written, verbal, image)?
- What other information is being passed, by whom, and how?
- How are decisions by the decision makers of the main groups passed?

Cognitive Dimension:

- How do the main groups see themselves?
  - Consider, at a minimum, family, religious, cultural, tribal variables.
- What are the main perceptions of the main groups towards their government, insurgents, their economy, business, other regional countries, and outsiders (such as the US and NGOs)?
- How does the population as a whole, and/or the main groups see themselves or others based on a historical incident/event?
- What current events or issues may be impacting their perceptions?
  - Consider those events and issues inside the AO and outside.
- What are the main groups most concerned with?
  - Consider local events, regional, international, economy, family, etc.
- Why do they send or support certain narratives?
Target Audience Analysis

The Target Audience Analysis is an eight step process outlined in FM 3-05.301 Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (August 2007). Marine IO Planners, working without the support of a MISO trained Soldier or Marine may follow these steps. A recommended option is to use a modified sequence of this process. This annex provides details for each step in the modified sequence.

**Modified TAA:**
1. Identify and Refine Target Audience (IO Planner / Intel Analyst)
2. Identify Conditions and Effects (IO Planner / Intel Analyst)
3. Identify Vulnerabilities (IO Planner / Intel Analyst / Cultural Advisor)
4. Determine Susceptibility (IO Planner)
5. Determine Accessibility (Intel Analyst)
6. Determine Effectiveness (IO Planner)
7. Develop Arguments and Recommend Actions (IO Planner)
8. Refine Assessment Criteria (Intel Analyst)

**STEP 1: Identify and Refine Target Audience (TA):** This step is conducted jointly by the IO Planner and Intel Analyst.

There are four general types of TAs:

1. Organizations
2. Demographic sets
3. Leaders
4. Key communicators

Before refining which TA to influence it is best to ask yourself five questions:

1. What TAs will be most effective in accomplishing the desired behavior?
2. What are the reasons for the TA’s current behavior?
3. What are the best means of communication to reach the TA?
4. How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior?
5. What are the appropriate criteria by which assess behavior change?
(Answering these questions will identify the best general TA to influence)

To refine the TA you need to ask yourself another set of questions:

1. What TAs are engaging (or likely to engage) in the targeted behavior? *These are your primary actors.*
2. What TAs are directly or indirectly influencing the behavior of the primary actors? *These are secondary actors.*
3. What are the subcategories among the primary and secondary actors? *These are refined TAs.*

(Answering these questions will identify specific individuals, organizations, and key demographics to influence)

NOTE: TAs must at least possess three things to be influenced:

1. Power/Effectiveness: TA must have the power to influence others unless it is an individual.
2. Accessibility: You must be able to reach a TA with messaging (KLE, Radio, TV, Poster, etc.)
3. Susceptibility: TA must be able and willing to be influenced.

**STEP 2: Identify Conditions and Effects:** This step is conducted jointly by the IO Planner and Intel Analyst.

Conditions are defined as the existing elements that affect a TA’s behavior. They are broken down into two sections:

1. External: These are situations or events. These can be broken down into economic, political, social/cultural, environmental/physical and military/security.
2. Internal: These are values, beliefs, or attitudes.

Determining the conditions is the key to understanding the behavior of a TA. If you can understand what causes and reinforces a particular behavior you are more likely to be able to influence or change the behavior of the TA.

NOTE: Researching conditions can be done strictly by an Intel Analyst. It is nothing but Intel Research.
Effects are consequences of a TA continuing their current behavior. They are broken down into three sections:

1. Positive: How is the TA rewarded for continuing their current behavior?
2. Negative: How is the TA punished for continuing their current behavior?
3. Secondary: How does the TA’s current behavior affect other unintended TAs?
   (Secondary and Unintended)

**STEP 3: Identify Vulnerabilities:** This step is conducted jointly by the IO Planner, Intel Analyst, and Cultural Advisor.

Vulnerabilities are defined as characteristics, motives, or conditions of the TA that can be used to influence behavior. They are broken down into four categories:

1. Motives: The needs, wants and desires of a TA.
2. Psychographics: The attitudes, values, lifestyles, motivations, and opinions.
3. Demographics: The TA’s breakdown based on various characteristics such as age, sex, income, education, etc.
4. Symbols: Visual, audio, or audiovisual objects having cultural or contextual significance to the TA. Symbols assist in identifying effective messaging (audio or visual).

**STEP 4: Determine Susceptibility:** This step is conducted by the IO Planner.

Susceptibility is the likelihood the TA will be open to persuasion. To determine susceptibility you must answer these three questions:

1. What are the perceived risks (negative consequences) by the TA to engage in the desired behavior?
2. What are the perceived rewards (positive consequences) by the TA to engage in the desired behavior?
3. How consistent is the desired behavior with the values and beliefs of the TA?

**STEP 5: Determine Accessibility:** This step is conducted by the Intel Analyst.

Accessibility is the availability of an audience for targeting using various capabilities/methods. Examples are:

- Radio
- Television
- Billboard
STEP 6: Determine Effectiveness: This step is conducted by the IO Planner.

Effectiveness refers to the ability of the TA to accomplish the desired behavioral change.

The following questions should be answered in determining the TA’s effectiveness to accomplish the desired behavior.

1. What degree of power, control, or authority does the TA have in regards to the desired behavior?
2. What restrictions affect the TA in regard to the desired behavior? Restrictions can be Physical/Environmental, Political, Economic, Legal, Sociological or Psychological.
3. If the TA takes the desired action what is the overall effect on the IO Task (Objective)?

STEP 7: Develop Arguments and Recommend Actions: This step is conducted by the IO Planner.

Argument is the overall argument and approach used to obtain the desired behavior. (Ex. “Reporting insurgent activity will lead to a safer environment.”)

- Appeals: Overall approach used to present the argument (Legitimacy, Inevitability, Bandwagon, etc.)
- Techniques: Specific influence methods used to present information to the TA (Least of Evils, Testimonials, Compare and Contrast, etc.)

A comprehensive list of all appeals and techniques can be found on pages 2-25 to 2-29 in FM 3-05.301.

Actions are conducted to influence a TA’s thoughts and perceptions by lethal or non-lethal means. Examples:

- Civil Affairs Projects
- Creditable voice/KLE
- Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP, VETCAP, etc.)
STEP 8: Identify and Refine Assessment Criteria (MOE): This step is conducted by the Intel Analyst.

Assessment criteria are measured actions of a TA conducting or not conducting the desired behavior (ex. Amount of TA that enlist in the Armed Forces).

Refined assessment criteria are exact measured actions of a TA conducting or not conducting the desired behavior (ex. Amount of TA that enlist in the Armed Forces during the month of May).
Annex E

Media

Questions to consider when conducting an analysis of the media environment
(Source: FM 3-05.301)

Radio and Television

- Where are the key radio and TV transmitters within the country?
- Who physically controls this site?
  - Who owns the station and controls the programming?
  - Is it possible to buy advertising time or other time segments for programs?
  - Who indirectly controls the viewpoints reflected in the programming? Are they pro-government or antigovernment?
- How is the site protected (physical barriers, personnel barriers)?
- What is the power of the transmitter?
- What is the frequency or channel used to transmit? What is the frequency or channel capacity for transmission?
- What is the effective broadcast range? What major terrain features affect transmission (for example, high or low ground)?
- Are there any repeating stations for the broadcasts? What are the locations?
- What type of antenna system is in use? What frequencies does it use? What is the configuration of the antennas?
- What type of equipment is at the site?
  - What country produced the equipment?
  - How old is the equipment?
  - What is the maintenance record of the equipment?
  - What format and type of prerecorded messages can the station broadcast?
- What is the on-site repair capability of technicians at the facility?
- How long can the facility operate without outside services? Where does its energy source originate?
- What is the listening or viewing audience of the station?
- What type of programming does the station broadcast?
  - Does the station do live broadcasts or record tapes?
  - What type of audio and audiovisual editing equipment does the station have?
  - What is the station’s video broadcast standard?
o What is the station’s video format?

o What types of music does the station play?

o What are the operating hours of the facility?

o Who is the POC with whom to coordinate station and equipment usage?

o What subjects for discussion are popular on the station?

o What topics are taboo or avoided for broadcasting?

o What are the peak viewing and listening hours for the population and for different target groups?

- Is the station credible in the eyes of the population? Does perceived credibility differ by economic background, social group, religious group, or military unit and rank?

- Does the populace listen to outside broadcasts from other countries or international entities? How are these received and perceived?

- What are the locations of in-theater contractors and vendors who can provide services and supplies for audio and audiovisual equipment?

Print Media

- What are the major printed media in the country (imported or printed in-country)?

- How influential is printed media within specific regions of the country?

- Who controls printed media?
  - Does any particular group edit or censor printed media (for example, government, military, religious, political, insurgent, or ethnic)?
  - Can ads be purchased?
  - Can editorials be submitted?

- In what language does printed media need to be printed?

- What are the subjects most often written about? Are these subjects popular with the readers?

- Who are the primary and secondary consumers of printed media? How credible are the media to groups within the country (for example, ethnic, religious, social, political, or military)?

- How is printed media delivered to consumers?

- Where are the major print plants within the country?
  - Who controls the sites?
  - What protective barriers are around the sites (physical barriers and personnel barriers)?
  - Where do their energy sources originate?

- Where do the plants get their supplies (imported, in-country)? Would these sources of supply also be available to Marines?
• Can the MAGTF stop these supplies? How long can the facilities operate once outside services are cut off?
• What is the on-site repair capability of the technicians at the facilities?
• What type of equipment is at the sites?
  o What country produced the equipment?
  o How old is the equipment?
  o What is the maintenance record of the equipment?
  o What is the output capacity of the equipment?
• What type of paper can be used in the presses?
• What colors can be used on the presses?
• What is the standard for outdoor media? Are billboards, posters, handbills, or banners used? How sophisticated are these outdoor media?
• Is there a system for mailing printed materials to particular segments of the population? Do mailing lists exist and are they available to MAGTF personnel?
• What are the locations of in-theater companies that can provide services and supplies to MAGTF assets?
• What are the major lines of communication (railroads, highways) located near existing print assets?
• Is printed media credible in the eyes of the population? Does perceived credibility differ by economic background, social group, religious group, or military unit and rank?

Communications

• What languages are spoken within the country?
• What written languages are used throughout the country? How literate are people within the country and within different regions, states, and provinces?
• What media do people trust most for obtaining information, and how accessible are the various groups through the different media?
  o What is the availability of TVs to the population and to the specific target groups?
  o What is the availability of radios to the population and to the specific target groups?
  o What is the availability of printed materials to the population and to the specific target groups?
  o How many people have access to printed material?
• What are the literacy rates for all selected target groups?
• What are the key symbols within the country? Do they differ by ethnic group, religion, social group, political group, military unit and rank, or insurgent group?
What are the visual or written taboos that might affect audiences when they look at print or other visual MISO products?

What are the Internet or web sites in the country or in countries friendly to the target country? Are assessments of the country’s computer capabilities being collected and maintained?

Who are the Internet service providers?
Annex F

Dominant Narrative

As a noun a narrative can be defined as a story or account of events, experiences, or the like, whether true or fictitious. A dominant narrative can be defined as a narrative that has the most control over the discussion of an event. This narrative can center on a future, current or historical event, or the position of a group (political, insurgent, government, military, business, etc). It can end up establishing perceptions and dictating what is discussed by the majority of a population of a given area. The event can be based on a real, fictitious, or embellished incident. In other words a dominant narrative is a storyline or theme of an event that dominates the news, has the ability to transcend daily life and issues, and the potential to influence key decision makers or large portions of a population.

There can be several contributing factors that make a narrative dominate. They can include the ability of the narrative to force other narratives to the background, the amount of attention given by the media, politicians, or special interest groups, the intensity of discussion at the street level, and its ability to cause political repressions, street demonstrations, business boycotts, and refusal of certain groups to interact with other groups. The ability to identify a dominant narrative may be based on these criteria, but could also be based on the subjective opinion of the IO Planner or Intel Analyst. If based on a subjective opinion, then the planner and analyst must be able to articulate their opinion with facts.

When identifying a dominant narrative the IO Planner and Intel Analyst should look at the body of work of reports and not just one article. Sources can be, but are not limited to, main stream media as well as media outlets owned by special interest groups, rumors heard on the street, and sermons, speeches, and communiqués by politicians, religious leaders, special interest groups, and insurgents. Areas to identify and analyze can include:

- The content of the narratives.
- The reason the narratives are important and dominate.
- The primary sources of narratives and why they are using them.
- The principle means, or conduits, used to tell or pass the narrative.
- Who is most likely to receive the narrative.
- The primary target audience of the narrative.
- How different groups interpret the narrative.
- The most likely person, persons, or groups to benefit from the narrative.
- The most likely person, persons, or groups to be harmed by the narrative.
• How much staying power the narrative has.
• Can the narrative can be related to other, broader, narratives.
• Competing narratives for the same event.
• Other narratives that get pushed aside or are negated.
• The difference between what the narrative says of the event, the perceptions the majority and/or minority of the population have of the event, and what really happened.
• Physical actions are being taken based on the narrative or in support of the narrative.

A narrative normally exists in the information dimension of the information environment. When analyzing the above information, the roles of not only the information dimension, but the cognitive and physical dimension should be considered as well. By analyzing the narrative across all the dimensions of the information environment the IO Planner and Intel Analyst can gain a full appreciation of its impact, determine its strengths and vulnerabilities, and develop a recommended plan to counter or preserve the narrative, depending on the goals of their commander. A basic assessment of the information environment should have the following:

• Informational Dimension: Identify the content of the narrative and the method it flows to an audience.
• Cognitive Dimension: Identify what kind of decisions have been made, or assess the type of decision that could be made, as a result of the narrative, and by whom. Also, what perceptions have been built, or could be built by key audiences based on the narrative.
• Physical Dimension: The actions that will occur or could occur on the ground as a result of, or in support of, the narrative. In addition identify the networks (human and physical) that support the development, transmission, and reception of the narrative.

On a final note, IO Planners and Intel Analysts, when looking for dominant narratives, should also consider narratives different groups want to make dominate in order to satisfy their own agenda. This can be done by the group repeating its narrative over and over in various mediums, linking the narrative to some real or fictitious event, staging events to bring attention to the narrative, and executing actions to support the narrative.
Annex G

Staff Estimate Examples

IO ESTIMATE NO.______
Date:

References:

a. Maps and Charts
b. Other relevant documents (Intel reports, Tacreps, Sit reps, Assessments)

1. **MISSION.** The Command mission identified in the Warning Order (updated during Problem Framing). May include a sub-paragraph with the IO Concept of Support

2. **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.**
   
   a. **Characteristics of the Information Environment.** Summarize significant characteristics of the information environment and the effects on military operations. Identify the IO key terrain (key actors (friendly, neutrals, adversarial), individuals, groups; networks, systems, activities in the IE) that will affect all operations or significantly impact future planning.
      
      i. **Physical Dimension.** How will terrain, weather, civil infrastructure, and populace factors impact the employment of military information systems and linking of information systems/networks.
      
      ii. **Informational Dimension.** How will information in the AO and its quality, distribution, and flow impact the functions of military information systems and populace decision making.
      
      iii. **Cognitive Dimension.** How will populace and third party perceptions, awareness, and understanding impact military operations. What are the key perceptions with regards to demographic groups, civil-political leadership, HN-friendly-adversarial operations.
   
   b. **Enemy Forces.** Enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and COSs that affect the information environment. What are the significant actions in the IE? What are collect, project, and protect activities? What are primary strengths/weaknesses/exploitable vulnerabilities? What are the dominant narratives?
   
   c. **Friendly Forces.**
i. Friendly courses of action. General (over-arching-nested) IO concept of support for the AO

ii. Current status of resources. The status of available organic IO assets (as translated into capabilities to operate in the information environment.) Identify MAGTF assets available that can affect/impact the information environment? What are the most likely conduits available that can support operations in the AO?

iii. Current status of other resources. The status of available supporting IO assets.

iv. Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

v. Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

3. Assumptions. IO assumptions developed in preparation for and during problem framing.

4. Planning Considerations and Recommendations for:
   a. Proposed IO Objectives
   b. Initial IO related tasks.
   c. Initial Target sets, audiences, targets (HVI’s, HVT’s)
   d. Identify IO issues: resource shortfalls-deficiencies, risks of engagement/non-engagement and recommendations to reduce the impacts
   e. Recommendations to counter adversary strengths and exploit vulnerabilities.
   f. CCIRs

5. COA ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria established by the OPT lead. Identify the IO concept of support, operational advantage, and priority of effort for each COA. Estimate the likelihood of accomplishing the IO objectives given the available time and capabilities. Determine the potential for and risk of unintended consequences associated with the COA, execution of IO tasks, and the possible impacts on friendly and enemy COAs.

6. COMPARISON. Compare COAs using the evaluation criteria. Rank order COAs for each criterion. If possible use a decision matrix to support.

7. RECOMMENDATION. Recommend COA based on the comparison (most supportable by IO). Identify IO objectives, essential tasks, and operational advantage.
1. **Mission.** Mission statement results from problem framing.

2. **Situation and Considerations**
   a. **Characteristics of the Area of Operation**
      1. **Weather.** How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?
      2. **Terrain.** How will aspects of terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?
      3. **Other Pertinent Facts.** Analyze political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure as they relate to the area.
   b. **Adversary Forces.** Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific staff areas of concern.
   c. **Friendly Forces**
      1. Friendly COA(s).
      2. Current status of resources.
      3. Current status of other resources.
      4. Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.
      5. Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.
   d. **Assumptions**

3. **Analysis.** Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages.

4. **Comparison.** Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank order COA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix.

5. **Recommendations and Conclusions**
   a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff perspective).
   b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.

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Example of a Staff Estimate Format as shown in MCWP 5-1
Annex H

Planning Tool Examples

Example of IO Concept of Support
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Annex I

Key Leader Engagement

Depending on assigned duties an IO Planner may be responsible for planning and coordinating key leader engagements (KLE), or at least supporting their efforts. The term key leader engagement (KLE) is a popular term, but there is no joint or Marine Corps definition for it and there is a possibility that other terms may be used within a MAGTF. Basically a KLE is a non-lethal engagement between any member (from the strategic corporal to the chaplain to the commander) of the MAGTF and an adversary, neutral, or friendly individual or individuals. The engagement can be face-to-face, but may also be through telecoms (video-teleconference, computer email or chat, phones, radio, etc), third parties, or written correspondence. The engagement may involve a decision maker(s) or someone with access to a key decision maker. When planning KLE’s key considerations are: who needs to be engaged, why, and for what end state (desired actions or behaviors). They should be approached with detailed preparation, a method of engagement, and a means to assess the action. Strong initiative is essential. There are many articles written on KLEs giving advice and techniques, and commands may have different strategies or procedures on how KLEs are conducted and by whom. This annex provides some recommended methods to prepare, execute, and assess a KLE.

For a KLE an IO Planner may have multiple roles and multiple support requirements.

- Based on target audience assessments made in conjunction with the Intel analyst during the planning process, the IO Planner will be able to make recommendations on who to engage, why, and who should conduct the actual engagement. Such recommendations should be included in the development of the IO Concept of Support and in support of the Targeting Process (HVI nominations).
- Detailed planning includes plans for supporting actions to be executed prior to the engagement (shaping), actions during the execution (monitoring, isolating), and post engagement (monitoring, exploitation).
- KLE planning includes: identifying engagement objectives, defining the endstate in terms of desired actions or behaviors of the target audience, developing the engagement narrative/theme, and identifying exploitable values, beliefs, or activities that can develop an operational advantage for the MAGTF member conducting the actual engagement. Conducting concurrent medical support or providing veterinary support to target audience livestock may provide a longer lasting affect than the actual engagement.
- The IO Planner may be responsible for building the engagement package and coordinating staff support. The planner may also be required to provide information or
recommendations for the engagement theme, supporting messages, and talking points to guide the conversation during the engagement.

Preparation for an engagement will include detailed planning and staff coordination.

- **Intelligence:** Needed information will include, but not be limited to:
  - Biographies on those being engaged to include recent and historical activities.
  - Data on the target audience’s personality to include how they base their decision and perceptions of current events, the MAGTF, MAGTF adversaries.
  - Any type of analysis showing relationships and means of communications the audience may have with other individuals or organizations hostile or friendly to the MAGTF.
  - Cultural aspects that may have an impact on how the meeting can be conducted or may impact the target audience.
  - What US information can and cannot be released.

- **External coordination:** This can include coordinating with organizations that may provide funding or are in contact with individuals (local nationals, interagency, private organizations, and MAGTF elements) who normally engage and observe the target audience. It is very important to reach out to other commands or civilian agencies outside the MAGTF that may have interacted with the target audience or may have ongoing operations that the MAGTF can support/augment/exploit.

- **Internal coordination:** A whole of staff approach should be taken when preparing for a KLE. Staff consideration if hosting the KLE include protocol checklist, arranging for facilities and providing needed supplies, and coordinating access or transportation of the visitor. Considerations if the target audience is hosting include arranging transportation and communications. Common will be the building of engagement packages, providing security, listing current and future projects, and having medical support available for the target audience.

- **Building an engagement package:** An engagement package is critical in order to prepare for the KLE. Information on the target audience, as well as information on how the discussion may unfold should be contained in the package. The format for building the package will be MAGTF dependent, but a recommended method is to have a 6-part folder containing an executive summary, key leader synopsis, current concerns, predictions on what the target audience will ask, list of what is already being done or provided for the target audience, and what will be asked of the target audience.

- **Prior communication with target audience:** There may be some prior communication with the target audience, or his representative, by members of the MAGTF or non-
MAGTF entity who may be arranging the engagement. This prior coordination is important in order to establish any ground rules, the size of the engagement, location, etc. This coordination will also identify any sequencing of events prior to engaging the target audience. These details need to be included in the engagement package.

- **Rehearsal:** A rehearsal should be conducted prior to the KLE. This will ensure the MAGTF representative conducting the KLE understands the content of the engagement package and is prepared to guide or to respond to points during the conversation if required. It will also allow time to work with the interpreter, discuss the flow of the engagement, become familiar with any material provided by the IO Planner, review seating arrangements, review cultural considerations, verify completed and pending CA/CMO projects, and work through any KLE checklist the MAGTF may have.

Conduct of engagement includes not only the engagement but a record of the event. A recorder should be identified during the preparation phase and be in position to best capture the events of the engagement. Multiple recorders should be used if possible. A simple recording format includes what was discussed, promises the target audience made, promises the MAGTF or other representatives traveling with the MAGTF made, and items for the next meeting. Other participants in the engagement could include:

- **Interpreters:** The quality and usage of an interpreter can be the difference between success or failure of a KLE. Translation needs to be word for word, where the interpreter does not insert his own words or intent into the conversation. A good strategy is for long engagements to have multiple interpreters and switch out as needed.
- **Medical Officers:** In some situations a medical officer may contribute to the conduct of an engagement. Depending on the economic or social level of the target audience, availability of a medical officer may be perceived extremely favorable and contribute to the success of the KLE. A medical officer can also be used to gain insight into the target audience that maybe of value during the actual engagement.
- **Female Engagement Teams:** FET members can support the engagement, conduct concurrent engagements (side bars with related audiences), support medical activities, and also gain insight into the target audience that maybe of value during the actual engagement or for post-exploitation efforts.
- **Interagency representative:** Some KLEs may involve interagency representation. It will be important to ensure that during the engagement they have the same message as the MAGTF representative. Ensuring a unified message should be coordinated during the preparation phase.
An assessment, or hot wash, must be conducted after every engagement. The engagement should be chronologically reviewed. Discussion points include insights into personalities (to include what interpreters or medical officers uncovered), what new intelligence was gained, and what requests were made.

### Example of a process for a planned face-to-face engagement conducted by a Commanding Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>96 hours prior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekly engagement working group:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Makes recommendations for upcoming engagement schedule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Initial guidance provided on what will and should be discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Biographies are staffed with subordinate unit for updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Read ahead package is staffed with the subordinate unit to provide the following answers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What the key leader will ask of us?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are we already doing for them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What should we ask of them? (Supporting fires to the battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Civil Affairs and other lead, if applicable, provides a list of projects – past, current, and planned – in support of the key leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engagement officer or deputy calls unit to confirm or clarify information provided.</td>
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</table>

| 48 hours prior |
|               |
|               |

| 24 hours prior |
|               |
|               |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Day of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducted by commander and other staff members or subordinated commander as designated by commander (provides united front).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes taken for debrief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Within 12 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hot wash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement report and executive summary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>